Hi, The Trusted Boot topic/thread was started on Fedora dev list, with the purpose of discussing it before planned F16 implementation. http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/devel/2011-June/153307.html They ask for input, and we would like to discuss it with them, before they bless us with the project implementation. I tried to subscribe to Fedora dev list, but there is no response, none. Is that a technical problem ? Are they afraid of their own community members ? Come on, I just wanted to have tete a tete with you :-) So I decided to post it on F16 test list to give people a heads-up. The Intel Trusted Platform consists of two components: - Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip A hardware component, consisting of cryptographic processor and secure memory. - Trusted Boot A software component, open-source and partially close-source (?) components, in Fedora packages. # yum install tboot Installing: tboot i686 20110429-1.fc15 fedora 355 k Installing for dependencies: trousers i686 0.3.6-1.fc15 fedora 279 k Trusted Boot is a mechanism by which a pre-kernel/VMM module (that uses Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT)) performs a measured (pre-identified) and verified launch of an OS kernel/VMM. First, the obvious questions. Why do you need Trusted Boot mechanism to ensure that identified and origin- verified Linux kernel is booted ? Why signing a kernel (a la GPG) is not good enough to verify its origin at boot time ? Now, regarding the Trusted Boot solution. The obvious question: why does an open-source distro like Fedora (but also Red Hat) want to philosophically accept and technically support this solution ? Will the TPM allow a third party remote access to the machine ? Will the TPM be BIOS-configurable (enable/disable) by the user (hardware owner) ? If so, how will that impact the kernel selection in boot process (tboot enable/disable) ? How is that tboot blob module secured from tampering ? By the virtue of beeing associated with the "root of trust" ? If the Launch Control Policy can be created and modified by the user, then what prevents an attacker from impersonating the usersysadmin, modifying the policy, and causing a denial-of-boot or unintended-boot attack ? There is more that this project implements (root of trust, etc). Ref: tcsd(8) Can that "root of trust" be compromised by TSS applications or any other means (e.g. through tools provided by this project) ? ... Ref: tcsd(8) DEVICE DRIVERS tcsd is compatible with the IBM Research TPM device driver available from http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa and the TPM device driver available from http://sf.net/projects/tmpdd Are these drivers open-source ? Is TPM device driver open-source ? Well, you know what to ask about ... JB Angela GHEORGHIU - Puccini - La Bohème - Si mi chiamano Mimi http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eiyT5_UipMs -- test mailing list test@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/test
