Hi All,
I'll try to answer inline. :)
On 2/18/20 1:18 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> I'm sure Lukas has seen this by now, but explicitly adding him just in case :)
>
Yes, Paul is right I saw it, sorry for late reply, these months are
quite busy for me.
The truth is, I'm no longer selinux-policy maintainer for Fedora and Red
Hat Enterprise Linux, however I'm still part of the team. :)
Zdenek Pytela, took maintenance responsibilities for selinux-policy
component. (adding him to CC)
> Fedora SELinux folks, Fedora has long held a special place at the
> forefront of SELinux development and it is a bit of a shame that the
> default SELinux policy on Fedora is missing so many of the
> classes/permissions.
Understand this point and agree with you that we're missing new classes
and permissions. However, we need to start adding new
classes/permissions wisely, to avoid introducing new SELinux policy bugs
on Stable or future Fedoras and that is the main reason why we're not
proactively accepting these patches from the refpolicy.
> I understand that stable Fedora releases will
> grow out of sync over time, but is there some way we can keep Rawhide
> current with upstream?
>
I fully agree that we should merge commits from the refpolicy, which
removing unused permissions and classes. This should *NOT* break anything.
Related to new permissions, we need to understand what are security
benefits of adding it to Fedora (and RHEL). The main goal is keep "good"
balance between usability and security (We cannot introduce any
regressions by adding policy features)
My suggestion is start with removing obsolete and unused
permissions/classes and after discussion (e.g here) we can start picking
some good candidate RFEs.
@Ondrej,
AFAIK, you prepared PR to remove unused classes and permissions, could
we merge it?
Thanks,
Lukas.
> On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 10:09 AM Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Fedora policy has a number of differences in its security_classes and
>> access_vectors from current refpolicy, and neither are fully up to date
>> with the kernel (but refpolicy is closer). One consequence of this is
>> that parts of the selinux-testsuite do not run by default on Fedora
>> (including rawhide) at present and still require manual patching by
>> testers if they want to exercise all the tests.
>>
>> Differences that I see include:
>>
>> - refpolicy has added the watch* permissions exercised by the
>> selinux-testsuite/tests/{notify,filesystem,fs_filesystem} tests. These
>> were first defined in refpolicy by
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/c656b97a289ce6c2da2871700384f0f9d831be18
>> but there have been a series of subsequent commits (one to fix an
>> ordering problem to better align with the kernel) and then allowing
>> these new watch permissions as needed.
>>
>> - refpolicy has added the perf_event class exercised by the
>> selinux-testsuite/tests/perf_event tests. These were first defined in
>> refpolicy by
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/624a63704c19a653486f37d11dc04bbe7d221f38.
>>
>> - Neither refpolicy nor fedora have yet added the lockdown class
>> exercised by selinux-testsuite/tests/lockdown. The kernel commit
>> introducing this class is
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/commit/59438b46471ae6cdfb761afc8c9beaf1e428a331.
>>
>> Other differences that don't directly affect the testsuite execution:
>>
>> - Drop unused socket security classes,
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/4637cd6f898e95ffa95b2d089916d3987bc7d55f
>>
>> - Remove unused permissions,
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/161bda392e61056ea22fe9862ad76c36ca8f35ca
>>
>> - Remove entrypoint and execute_no_trans from chr_file,
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/8486b8aa83afa7abd94c9338e8845c2cbeb67f31
>>
>> - remove flow_in and flow_out permissions from packet class,
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/f4459adf3242ed2dbc35e2125f55ec299378c04c
>>
>> - Rename obsolete netlink_firewall_socket and netlink_ip6fw_socket
>> classes,
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/5fd175fa453e995d8b7357b87403fbbeb4e54ea8
>>
>> - Remove unused translate permission in context userspace class,
>> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/commit/65da822c1b5c70bd1ff7eca645f5f9fd74fa949e
>>
>> - Fedora policy has an "undefined" permission in its class system access
>> vector, not present in refpolicy (some kind of compatibility hack?).
>>
>> - Fedora policy has an "epolwakeup" permission in its class capability2
>> access vector, not present in refpolicy (old name for block_suspend,
>> never included in an official kernel release, also not even correct
>> originally - should have been epollwakeup).
>>
>> - Fedora policy has "getnetgrp" and "shmemnetgrp" permissions in its
>> class nscd access vector, not sure if those are used by glibc/ncsd code
>> but if so should get added to refpolicy too.
>>
>> - Fedora policy has a "proxy" class and access vector for "gssd", not
>> present in refpolicy. If that's something that isn't Fedora-specific,
>> it should probably get upstreamed to refpolicy although the class name
>> isn't very descriptive.
>>
>> - refpolicy has "db_exception" and "db_datatype" classes and access
>> vectors for "Interbase/Firebird/Red Database", not present in Fedora.
>> Don't know if that matters to Fedora.
>>
>> - Various whitespace/comment cleanups in refpolicy not in Fedora.
>>
>> - process2 is declared at a different place in security_classes in
>> refpolicy versus Fedora. Doesn't really matter since kernel uses
>> dynamic class/perm support and no fixed definition ever defined in
>> libselinux/libsepol headers but might be good to align them for consistency.
>>
>> NB The removals and renames may have some compatibility implications,
>> e.g. a local or third party policy module built against the existing
>> Fedora policy headers may have picked up dependencies on these
>> classes/permissions and therefore may need to be rebuilt against the
>> updated headers in order to still link successfully. This could break
>> upon an update if those local or third party modules were installed at
>> the time of the update since we'd fail on the semodule -B during %post,
>> leaving the system with the old policy. rpm selinux support was
>> supposed to fix that kind of thing by handling it via plugin and not
>> from %post and rolling the package update back but never got adopted/used ;(
>
--
Lukas Vrabec
SELinux Evangelist,
Senior Software Engineer, Security Technologies
Red Hat, Inc.
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