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On 03/13/2013 12:17 PM, Dominick Grift wrote:
> On Wed, 2013-03-13 at 09:36 -0600, Erinn Looney-Triggs wrote:
>> I have an odd problem. Users running as staff_u are unable to run ls in
>> /var on one system only (though I haven't tested all of them).
>>
>> It is definetly an SELinux thing, setenforce 0, problem goes away,
>> setenforce 1, problem returns. ausearch -m avc -ts now shows nothing.
>>
>> restorecon on /var yields nothing and the labels are the same from one
>> system to the next.
>>
>> id -Z staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
>>
>> Same on both systems (this is set via IPA and SSSD)
>>
>> So I can't really figure out where the problem lies:
>>
>> ls -lZd /var drwxr-xr-x. root root system_u:object_r:var_t:s0 /var
>>
>> Any ideas?
>>
>> -Erinn
>>
>
> If SELinux blocks it logs the denial. Sometimes the event is silently
> denied (like probably in your case). In that case you can temporarily
> expose hidden denials by running: semodule -DB. Use this to get the AVC
> denial of the event (reproduce the event). After you have the AVC denial,
> run: semodule -B to load the policy with the hidden denial runs
> re-inserted.
>
> Now that you have the AVC denial of the event you can use this information
> to query the policy.
>
> I will just make some assumptions here:
>
> 1. source context type is: staff_t 2. target context type is: var_t 3.
> target security class is: dir 4. permission is: read
>
> When one runs ls in /var, one actually reads the /var directory file to get
> the entries (e.g. listing the contents of the directory)
>
> Now one can use the sesearch command to see if the policy allows this. If
> it does it will return a rule matching your query:
>
> sesearch -ASCT -s staff_t -t var_t -c dir -p read
>
> Example (Fedora 18)
>
>> # sesearch -ASCT -s staff_t -t var_t -c dir -p read Found 1 semantic av
>> rules: allow staff_usertype var_t : dir { ioctl read getattr lock search
>> open } ;
>
> So in Fedora 18 staff_t is allowed to read directory files with type
> var_t.
>
> If you follow these steps then you should be able to figure out why it is
> allowed on one system but not on another system.
>
> One reason could be that each system has a different policy.
>
> In the past staff was not allowed to list /var but i suppose that has
> recently changed.
>
>> -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>
>
> -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>
We have dontaudit rules for getattr and perhaps listing of directories to stop
staff_t or other unconfined domains from generating thousands of AVC messages.
For example ls /usr/bin from a confined user could generate lots of SELinux
blocks. Similarly ps -eZ, or even bash command completion. One would figure
you are hitting these dontaudit rules.
On Fedora 19 I see these rules
sesearch -A -s staff_t -t var_t -c dir -p read
Found 1 semantic av rules:
allow staff_usertype var_t : dir { ioctl read getattr lock search open } ;
So staff domains are allowed to list the contents of /var, but if a directory
under /var has a different label, staff_t could be blocked.
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