2008/3/27 Jesse Keating <jkeating@xxxxxxxxxx>:
Again, this argument is bunk. If they're not supposed to be ran by
normal users, hiding them behind a path is no form of security. One can
just run the full path to it. If they're not supposed to be ran by
users, they should have correct permissions on them, or they should
check EUID of the caller before doing anything.
The question is, do we have programs down the sbins that make the wrong assumption about path segregation equalling protection? And if so, how many? The obvious ones to me that need scrutiny are the executables that are setuid root. Do we need to take some extra care about those setuid'd executables?
-jef
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