Re: Three steps we could take to make supply chain attacks a bit harder

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Dne 30. 03. 24 v 22:14 Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek napsal(a):
On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 08:00:29PM +0100, Kevin Kofler via devel wrote:
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
I think there's some useful points here, but this would need to be
qualified and/or made more flexible to be applied.

For example, systemd repo has fuzzer case files, which are a mix of
text, mojibake, and actual binary protocol samples. For example, dhcp
input packets, dns packets. There are also other ~binary test files,
for example corrupted journal files.

The tests are defined via meson.build, so those files are "referred to
in the build tools", and would not be allowed by the above definition.
But if we dropped those, we'd lose very valuable testing of the codebase.
On the other hand, "test files" are exactly how the payload of this backdoor
was disguised! So a policy that deletes all binary test files or even all
test files altogether would have prevented this backdoor.
Well, if we made a rule that "binary" files are not allowed


I think that we should really not talk about binary files and talk e.g. about pre-generated files instead. This chapter in guidelines is already trying to cover this:

https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/what-can-be-packaged/#pregenerated-code

But maybe we should rewrite the "No inclusion of pre-built binaries or libraries" chapter above to be more generic.


Vít





, the
attacker would e.g. commit some minified bash that generates whatever output
is needed. The real problem was the complex and unreadable build system
that made it easy to embed _multiple_ obfuscated components for the attack.

To trust code, it needs to be reviewed. And if the code is reviewed,
and the build system is sane, it's usually fairly easy to say "oh,
this is a sample and the only way it's used is as input to a fuzzer
binary", or "this sample is used as input to a unit test", etc.

A policy against binary files would hinder this particular implementation
of the attack, but the attacker had full control of the repo, so they
would be able to arrange the attack around such a policy without too
much trouble.

Zbyszek
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