Re: Three steps we could take to make supply chain attacks a bit harder

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Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
> I think there's some useful points here, but this would need to be
> qualified and/or made more flexible to be applied.
> 
> For example, systemd repo has fuzzer case files, which are a mix of
> text, mojibake, and actual binary protocol samples. For example, dhcp
> input packets, dns packets. There are also other ~binary test files,
> for example corrupted journal files.
> 
> The tests are defined via meson.build, so those files are "referred to
> in the build tools", and would not be allowed by the above definition.
> But if we dropped those, we'd lose very valuable testing of the codebase.

On the other hand, "test files" are exactly how the payload of this backdoor 
was disguised! So a policy that deletes all binary test files or even all 
test files altogether would have prevented this backdoor.

        Kevin Kofler
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