On 2/13/24 7:36 AM, Jerry James wrote: > On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 11:16 AM Marius Schwarz <fedoradev@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> In a german developer blog article was the topic raised, that with >> uprobes enabled, userland apps can i.e. circumvent tls security(and >> other protections), >> by telling the kernel to probe the function calls with the uprobes api. >> As this enables i.e. the hosting system of a vm or container, to track >> activity inside the container, trust is lost i.e. from customer to >> hoster. To be fair, you need to be root on the host to do this, but as >> it "wasn't possible before", and it is "now" ( out in a greater public >> ), it tends to create trust issues, just for being there*. >> >> As this only works with uprobes enabled and has no use case besides a >> developer debugging apps, the question is: >> >> Do we need this for all others out there enabled by default? > > Both systemtap and bpftrace can use uprobes. Those capabilities have > been important from time to time in my job. That does not mean that > my ability to do my job should outweigh security concerns, of course, > but I think some effort should be made to find out if use of uprobes > via systemtap and bpftrace is common amongst Fedora users. "perf probe" can also define events based on uprobes, which makes them available to "perf record", "perf trace", etc. -- _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Do not reply to spam, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure/new_issue
