On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 3:29 AM Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On 10/13/22 07:18, Kevin Kofler via devel wrote: > >> For the last 20 years or so, RPM has used a home-grown OpenPGP parser > >> for dealing with keys and signatures. That parser is rather infamous > >> for its limitations and flaws, and especially in recent years has > >> proven a significant burden to RPM development. In order to improve > >> security and free developer resources for dealing with RPM's "core > >> business" instead, RPM upstream is in the process of deprecating the > >> internal parser in favor of [https://sequoia-pgp.org/ Sequoia PGP] > >> based solution written in Rust. > > > > Why are you using a new library written in Rust? Can you not use one of the > > existing mature C implementations of OpenPGP? gpgme maybe? > > Had there been such an option, we would've switched over years ago. > Gpgme is based around calling and communicating with an external gpg > process, which is a setup you do NOT want in the rpm context where > chroots come and go etc. Also, rpm requires access to the "low-level" > digests-in-progress because it calculates multiple things on a single read. > The real problem is that all other OpenPGP implementations died out because of GnuPG. And then GnuPG made the choice to force an inter-process model. At work, I deal with this on Debian systems, which do indeed use GnuPG for this. It creates a lot of problems, especially for building images and dealing with chroots, which is why in the context of RPM PGP upstream, I never pushed to consider it. The most serious problems with PackageKit memory leaks and hangs are actually caused by GnuPG, since DNF uses it for some GPG stuff because there's no API for using RPM's PGP capabilities. There's no fix unless the RPM and DNF teams agree on an API and build it out so that libdnf and librepo no longer need to use GnuPG through gpgme anymore. This is also the underlying reason why Red Hat has resisted implementing signed repository metadata and enforcing it by default. Of course this is a bit of a catch-22 as well, as there's no motivation to find a solution because neither Fedora nor RHEL offer signed repository metadata despite repeated calls for it over the past decade. Now, don't get me wrong: I'm personally extremely unhappy about having to depend on the Sequoia stack for RPM PGP. I have a strong distaste for the Rust community ecosystem these days, and I don't love the idea of having to have LLVM in the core bootstrap chain (hopefully gcc-rs will be in place soon enough!). But we literally don't have any other options. GnuPG/GPGME is out of the question for the reasons Panu and I stated, and NeoPG died several years ago. There are no C/C++ libraries for OpenPGP verification. If there was *any other choice*, we would have taken it. Even splitting out RPM's internal OpenPGP code into its own project for someone to rework and upgrade would be an option if someone actually wanted to. The reality is that nobody wants to work on that. So here we are, in a subpar situation created by bad tools because nobody cares enough about security anyway. -- 真実はいつも一つ！/ Always, there's only one truth! _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Do not reply to spam, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure/new_issue
