Re: Landing a larger-than-release change (distrusting SHA-1 signatures)

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On Wed, Mar 9, 2022 at 7:05 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 09, 2022 at 06:45:49PM +0100, Alexander Sosedkin wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 9, 2022 at 6:22 PM Matthew Miller <mattdm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Mar 09, 2022 at 12:14:28PM +0100, Alexander Sosedkin wrote:
> > > > I left my crystal ball at home today,
> > > > but I don't need it to say it'd be ~0 bugs filed if we log to syslog
> > > > and ~3 if we log to stderr/stdout, all named
> > > > "$CRYPTOLIB has no business messing up my stderr/stdout",
> > > > which we'll promptly close by reverting the changes.
> > >
> > > Yeah, that's a little more cynically-phrased than I'd put it, but I had
> > > similar thoughts.
> > >
> > > But: maybe if we logged it _and_ had a tool people could run to
> > > look specifically for those log entries, we could do something like a Test
> > > Day where people could send in reports?
> >
> > On one hand, this still is a risky territory
> > of libraries leaning heavily into things that libraries shouldn't do
> > because they can never guess the weird ways they're being used
> > when they have existing interfaces to deny operations with some algorithms.
> >
> > On the other hand, this makes much more sense to me
> > than the stdout/stderr proposal.
>
> The reason I suggested stderr was because it is about the only channel
> you can have a reasonable guarantee of being able to use from a library
> that has no knowledge about its execution environment.

I don't think there is a reasonable guarantee you can use it.
It's normal for a daemon to close inherited file descriptors
and open something radically different as FD 3, right?
And then we're writing our scary messages who knows where.

> Security policies applied to procesess (SELinux, seccomp, namespaces or
> containerization in general) can easily prevent ability to use journald,
> syslog, or opening of log files, leading to messages not being visible.

If the goal is some visibility, then it might...

> At worst, with seccomp an attempt to use the blocked feature may lead
> to an abort of the application.

sigh.

> With regards,
> Daniel
> --
> |: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
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>
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