Re: Remove old GPG keys?

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 10/31/2017 04:08 PM, Christopher wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 3:06 PM David Cantrell <dcantrell@xxxxxxxxxx
> <mailto:dcantrell@xxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
> 
>     On 10/31/2017 11:32 AM, R P Herrold wrote:
>     > On Tue, 31 Oct 2017, David Cantrell wrote:
>     >
>     >>> # rpm -qa gpg-pubkey --qf "%{version}-%{release} %{summary}\n"|wc -l
>     >>> 64
>     >>
>     >> Do we issue revocations for old keys?  If not, let's do that and
>     extend
>     >> dnf to honor those and clean up?
>     >
>     > What is the 'use case' for potentially preventing installation
>     > against a already know key of a existing, but older 'noarch'
>     > package; or one unpacking an older SRPM and NOT getting the
>     > scary NOKEY warning?  The size of the keys is trivial, even
>     > though they do tend to accrete in a 'long running' instance
>     >
>     > heck, I'll wager mostly those keys are never countersigned
>     > into a web of trust, and sent to the constellation of GnuPG
>     > key-servers in the first place
>     >
>     > Going even further, and revoking the keys is 'fly-specking'
>     > overkill
>     >
>     > I have no problem with removing keys not _used_ on a given
>     > host (such information being able to be compiled out of the
>     > RPM database)
> 
>     I don't really consider this a thing about saving space or making the
>     output of 'rpm -qa' look nicer or something, but rather being good users
>     of GPG.  If we create and then phase out signing keys, then part of our
>     process should also involve sending revocations for the old keys.  And
>     that process could be automated by a dnf plugin too.  Leaving old keys
>     around on the system for verification purposes presents a risk should
>     the old key become compromised.
> 
> 
> Why wouldn't the keys have expiration dates, following best practices?
> An expired key is a bit friendlier of a nudge off of using outdated and
> unsupported RPMs than a revoked key, which indicates a potential
> compromise. I would expect any GPG keys for Fedora versions older than
> EOL+5 or EOL+10 years to have already expired. Is that not the case?

I don't know if the keys have expiration dates or not, but that would be
effective too.  And our packaging tools could clean things up based on
that information as well.

-- 
David Cantrell <dcantrell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Red Hat, Inc. | Boston, MA | EST5EDT
_______________________________________________
devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx




[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[Index of Archives]     [Fedora Announce]     [Fedora Kernel]     [Fedora Testing]     [Fedora Formulas]     [Fedora PHP Devel]     [Kernel Development]     [Fedora Legacy]     [Fedora Maintainers]     [Fedora Desktop]     [PAM]     [Red Hat Development]     [Gimp]     [Yosemite News]
  Powered by Linux