On Tue, Aug 09, 2016 at 01:32:10PM -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > > > On 08/09/2016 10:24 AM, Michal Sekletar wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > Most of you are probably aware that systemd except running as PID 1 > > also runs inside user sessions. This allow users to define their own > > "user services" and start up various scripts and background processes > > right after logging in. > > > > In default targeted policy PID 1 runs with init_t SELinux label and > > --user instances of systemd are not confined by SELinux, i.e. running > > with unconfined_t. > > > > During Flock I got asked whether we can change that and run systemd > > --user instances in some confined domain. Fixing this on systemd side > > should be trivial, i.e. we would have to add SELinuxContext= option > > with appropriate value to /usr/lib/systemd/system/user@.service (unit > > file used for spawning user instances of systemd). > > > > I am writing this email with a hope that we can discuss if above > > proposal even makes sense (what are possible gains from system > > security perspective) and if yes what is appropriate SELinux label to > > use (I guess we would need new one and define policy for it). > > Yes we should allow for systemd to specify a label, but the label needs > to be transitioned from the user domain. > > For example if I login as unconfined_t and want to run a service as > httpd_t, then I need to be able to transition from > unconfined_t to httpd_t. As long as systemd-user is running as the user > domain, then SElinux will control this. That doesn't seem useful ;) Why would a user by able run anything as httpd_t? The way I understand Michal's question is: in what ways specifying a context for systemd --user that is different than current unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t would be actually useful? What general rules for transitions could be provided? Zbyszek -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.fedoraproject.org/admin/lists/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
