On 08/09/2016 10:24 AM, Michal Sekletar wrote: > Hi all, > > Most of you are probably aware that systemd except running as PID 1 > also runs inside user sessions. This allow users to define their own > "user services" and start up various scripts and background processes > right after logging in. > > In default targeted policy PID 1 runs with init_t SELinux label and > --user instances of systemd are not confined by SELinux, i.e. running > with unconfined_t. > > During Flock I got asked whether we can change that and run systemd > --user instances in some confined domain. Fixing this on systemd side > should be trivial, i.e. we would have to add SELinuxContext= option > with appropriate value to /usr/lib/systemd/system/user@.service (unit > file used for spawning user instances of systemd). > > I am writing this email with a hope that we can discuss if above > proposal even makes sense (what are possible gains from system > security perspective) and if yes what is appropriate SELinux label to > use (I guess we would need new one and define policy for it). > > Michal > -- > devel mailing list > devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.fedoraproject.org/admin/lists/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Yes we should allow for systemd to specify a label, but the label needs to be transitioned from the user domain. For example if I login as unconfined_t and want to run a service as httpd_t, then I need to be able to transition from unconfined_t to httpd_t. As long as systemd-user is running as the user domain, then SElinux will control this. -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.fedoraproject.org/admin/lists/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx