Re: Proposal to reduce anti-bundling requirements

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On 02/10/15 15:22, Matthew Miller wrote:
On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 02:19:19PM +0200, Ralf Corsepius wrote:
only for projects where upstream is fully active and cares about the
security vulnerabilities in the bundled copies of software well.
Correct. That's one of the criteria, FPC is trying to consider when
granting bundling exceptions. Openly said, these are the easy cases,
we often grant bundling exceptions.

The problematic ones are those cases, when it's obvious upstream
lacks experience and/or technical skills to understand "unbundling"
/"bundling" and resources to take care about "upstreams of their
bundled sources. These often are smaller projects - in many cases -
one-man shows.

Ralf, right now the documented list of reasons FPC might allow
exceptions don't give this impression. The closest I see is "Active
upstream Security Team", but that has a number of qualifications linked
by capital-letters and bold, like "the upstream project is actively
working on unbundling" and also notes "this rationale may not be
sufficient in and of itself" and that this exception is likely to be
temporary.

Well I have personal experience of FPC refusing a bundling exception even when the upstream of the bundled source is essentially dead and hence not in any position to respond to anything so I don't really buy it either.

I'm actually very much in favour of not allowing bundling in general and mostly wish we would keep the current policy.

That said I do realise it is becoming more and more of a problem and what I was originally seeing mostly in javascript code while dealing with node modules is not spreading more into C++ code and the like.

Currently the situation is such, and the (perceived) difficulty of getting exceptions such that I avoid even reviewing things where it looks likely to be an issue never mind actually packaging them myself.

Recently I even saw a case of a header only C++ library bundling another C++ head library which raises slightly metaphysical questions since dependants of a header only library need to be rebuilt when it changes anyway if they are to pickup security fixes. Strictly speaking that's even true of a more traditional library if the security fix happens to be in a header, but I wonder how well we pick up such things and propagate them?

Tom

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Tom Hughes (tom@xxxxxxxxxx)
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