On 03/06/2015 06:55 PM, Michael Catanzaro wrote: > Well... yes, I suppose if you've left your computer on and locked, and > the attacker wants to make sure you do not notice the reboot, or wants > to get a RAM dump that would be lost when shut down (e.g. for my > gnome-keyring passwords), then there is some benefit, but to a quite > limited extent IMO: the attacker is still limited by the speed at which > PAM and gdm allow you to try logging in. Every guess takes something > like three seconds. So I think a weak password suffices. *cough* https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=731616 *cough* -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
