Hi! On Fri, 2015-03-06 at 23:01 +0100, Björn Persson wrote: > or if the attacker snuck into your room when you left it to fetch some > coffee, and needs to unlock your console, implant a backdoor and sneak > back out before you return, or otherwise can't reboot your computer > because you would notice it, Well... yes, I suppose if you've left your computer on and locked, and the attacker wants to make sure you do not notice the reboot, or wants to get a RAM dump that would be lost when shut down (e.g. for my gnome-keyring passwords), then there is some benefit, but to a quite limited extent IMO: the attacker is still limited by the speed at which PAM and gdm allow you to try logging in. Every guess takes something like three seconds. So I think a weak password suffices. > In the previous paragraph you wrote that it does matter. It seems that > what you're actually arguing is that the threshold should be very low. Personally, I'd be fine with the password strength check if the threshold was very low, but my proposed threshold is *way* lower than libpwquality can be configured to accept. Different thresholds could make sense for different products. Obviously many other folks want it completely gone. Changing libpwquality would be quite desirable so we can close the upstream bugs in gnome-control-center and gnome-initial-setup. Michael -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
