-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 03/20/2013 09:49 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 10:07:48PM +0100, Kevin Kofler wrote: >> Kees Cook wrote: >>> AFD was a single specific program doing a very specific task and >>> hardly represents an "average workload". I remain extremely >>> disappointed that the default-on state was reverted. Ubuntu has had >>> this feature enabled for YEARS now, and it stopped quite a few exploits >>> cold. >> >> Who knows what other applications this extremely surprising and >> incompatible change breaks? (IMHO, even private /tmp is a better >> solution. It's also an incompatible change, but at least it has semantics >> a normal user can understand, whereas your solution layers really >> complicated hidden rules on top of something as basic as file >> permissions.) >> >> I'm with Linus when he says "Breaking applications is unacceptable. End >> of story. It's broken them. Get over it." We aren't ready to enable >> private /tmp for the same reason, so why is this hack any more >> acceptable? >> >> IMHO the initscripts change should be reverted and we should stick to >> Linus's defaults. He said "no" for a reason. > > https://lwn.net/Articles/543273/ "On a vanilla kernel, protected_hardlinks > unfortunately has the default value zero" That's what Linus's defaults get: > vulnerable-by-default. > > Specialized applications are the exception, and if you use them, it's your > responsibility to tune your system as needed. Why leave your system > vulnerable to script-kiddie attacks by default? > > The semantics of both world-writable sticky directories and hardlink access > are undefined by POSIX. This fix was not a "hack", it corrects a bad > decision made over a decade ago that was overwhelming more commonly used > for vulnerability exploitation purposes. > > -Kees > I agree, we make lots of decisions in the OS that have the ability to break applications by default. FireWall, SELinux, Services disabled by default, not allowing tons of setuid apps, other settings like mmap_zero. If we do not secure the machine by default then no users, especially naive users will turn on these protections. Linus has different requirements for the kernel, but leaves it up to the distributions to configure the kernel. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlFLCGQACgkQrlYvE4MpobOuqQCgyX7uHmRCo8HzSEiVLrKXggbL UX4An3hrqSLprTbv2zcEYmZ0dUh3SphI =1WRB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
