Re: RemoveSETUID feature (Was: Summary/Minutes from today's FESCo meeting (2010-10-26) NEW TIME!)

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tis 2010-12-21 klockan 11:47 -0500 skrev Colin Walters:

> "But they still have uid 0, which typical system installation allows
> root to do things. For example, /bin/sh is 0755 and /bin is also 0755
> perms. A disarmed root process can still trojan a system. But what if
> we got rid of all the read/write permissions for root?"

Eh? A process given capabilities via file capablities do not need to run
with uid 0. It can run as the calling user (no setuid bit), and is what
RemoveSETUID is about.

For things started as root, a capabilities aware system service started
as root can drop to a non-root user while keeping the capabilities it
needs. But this is not using file capabilities. But practicaly nothing
accessed bu users should be running as root.

Regards
Henrik

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