> If one application acquires an authorization it automatically authorizes all other applications running on the same desktop -- and I think that is a potential attack vector for malware. maybe this is about sudo and a like things but PolicyKit is designed AFAIK to be much fine grained, it does not give privileges to entire applications, for example I can grant system-config-something the right to write some file this does not mean that I grant it other rights http://hal.freedesktop.org/docs/PolicyKit/polkit-spec-history.html http://hal.freedesktop.org/docs/PolicyKit/intro-define-problem.html http://hal.freedesktop.org/docs/PolicyKit/model.html and from the last one we read <<EOQ PolicyKit assumes a model where a program is split into two parts. One part, the Mechanism, runs privileged (with no user interface elements) and the other part, the policy agent, runs unprivileged. The two parts of the program are in different processes and communicate through some IPC mechanism such as pipes or the system message bus (D-Bus). In some instances the Mechanism can be considered part of the core OS and the policy agent part of the desktop stack. EOQ for example when I double click on some partition on the harddisk I'll be asked for the password, this does not mean that nautilus or whatever is privileged -- fedora-devel-list mailing list fedora-devel-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-devel-list
