Martin Stransky wrote:
For instance, NPAPI plugins can share memory with browser and operate
with internal browser memory (like DOM tree) and this "feature" is
blocked by nspluginwrapper because of it's simple architecture.
Full browser-side emulation will be extremely complex and is close to
chrome model where one process holds one browser page...
ma.
From both a security and privacy point of view you actually want to
sandbox plugins. Many of the security fixes to IE over the past 3 years
(which weren't pure bug fixes) was to limit what you can do from
javascript. The last thing that you want to do is to give a scripting
engine unbridled access to the DOM tree and the browser's internal
memory. The chrome model does not solve this problem.
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