Paul van der Vlis - 22.09.17, 12:43: > Op 14-09-17 om 15:21 schreef Martin Steigerwald: > > Hello Paul. > > > > Paul van der Vlis - 14.09.17, 14:32: > >> I have bought many laptops with privacy-sensitive data on /home in > >> ecryptfs on the SSD. And I have promised to carefull remove the data > >> before re-using. > >> > >> What would you advice to do? Is it possible to overwrite the master key > >> for example? Or is it a good idea to change the passphrase in a very > >> long one? > > > > Technically you can´t really overwrite it. SSDs use Copy on Write. > > > > Also I think the passphrase in Ecryptfs just encrypts a key used to > > encrypt > > the data… not the data itself. > > > > > > Generic hint for securely erasing SSDs. > > > > https://ata.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/ATA_Secure_Erase > > This is what I am doing now. The SSD's I've tried are normally freezed, > but after awaking from suspend-to-ram not anymore. > > It looks complex, but it's fast and doable. But indeed not nice to rely > on the firmware of the SSD... > > What I would like are stupid-SSD's without a controller, where the > filesystem does everything. Or a SSD with open source controller firmware. Yep. Open Channel SSDs. But well, I never seen anything like that for laptops or other kind of consumer hardware. Then add to it Coreboot or even Libreboot. This ThinkPad T520 still has Intel Crapware^W Management Engine on it. I disabled it in the firmware settings… but… I know it can be removed meanwhile… but as it is not my laptop, I just update the BIOS/UEFI firmware once in a while. But there are rarely any new updates. So I bet that TCP/IP stack in IME has a ton of unfixed security issues by now. Free hardware… thats the next revolution! Thanks, -- Martin -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe ecryptfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
