----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
> Von: "Christian Göttsche" <cgoettsche@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> capable() calls refer to enabled LSMs whether to permit or deny the
> request. This is relevant in connection with SELinux, where a
> capability check results in a policy decision and by default a denial
> message on insufficient permission is issued.
> It can lead to three undesired cases:
> 1. A denial message is generated, even in case the operation was an
> unprivileged one and thus the syscall succeeded, creating noise.
> 2. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to ignore
> those denial messages, hiding future syscalls, where the task
> performs an actual privileged operation, leading to hidden limited
> functionality of that task.
> 3. To avoid the noise from 1. the policy writer adds a rule to permit
> the task the requested capability, while it does not need it,
> violating the principle of least privilege.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_drv.c | 2 +-
This change is unrelated, please remove it.
> fs/ubifs/budget.c | 5 +++--
> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
[...]
> diff --git a/fs/ubifs/budget.c b/fs/ubifs/budget.c
> index d76eb7b39f56..6137aeadec3f 100644
> --- a/fs/ubifs/budget.c
> +++ b/fs/ubifs/budget.c
> @@ -256,8 +256,9 @@ long long ubifs_calc_available(const struct ubifs_info *c,
> int min_idx_lebs)
> */
> static int can_use_rp(struct ubifs_info *c)
> {
> - if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), c->rp_uid) || capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) ||
> - (!gid_eq(c->rp_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID) && in_group_p(c->rp_gid)))
> + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), c->rp_uid) ||
> + (!gid_eq(c->rp_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID) && in_group_p(c->rp_gid)) ||
> + capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
> return 1;
> return 0;
> }
The UBIFS part looks ok:
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@xxxxxx>
Since I was not CC'ed to the whole series, I miss a lot of context.
Will this series merged as a whole? By whom?
Thanks,
//richard
