[PATCH v2 15/16] mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function

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With all "silently resizing" callers of ksize() refactored, remove the
logic in ksize() that would allow it to be used to effectively change
the size of an allocation (bypassing __alloc_size hints, etc). Users
wanting this feature need to either use kmalloc_size_roundup() before an
allocation, or call krealloc() directly.

For kfree_sensitive(), move the unpoisoning logic inline. Replace the
open-coded ksize() in __do_krealloc with ksize() now that it doesn't
perform unpoisoning.

Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@xxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx
Cc: kasan-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 mm/slab_common.c | 38 ++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index d7420cf649f8..60b77bcdc2e3 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1160,13 +1160,8 @@ __do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
 	void *ret;
 	size_t ks;
 
-	/* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
-	if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
-		if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
-			return NULL;
-		ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p);
-	} else
-		ks = 0;
+	/* How large is the allocation actually? */
+	ks = ksize(p);
 
 	/* If the object still fits, repoison it precisely. */
 	if (ks >= new_size) {
@@ -1232,8 +1227,10 @@ void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
 	void *mem = (void *)p;
 
 	ks = ksize(mem);
-	if (ks)
+	if (ks) {
+		kasan_unpoison_range(mem, ks);
 		memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
+	}
 	kfree(mem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
@@ -1242,10 +1239,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
  * ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object
  * @objp: Pointer to the object
  *
- * kmalloc may internally round up allocations and return more memory
+ * kmalloc() may internally round up allocations and return more memory
  * than requested. ksize() can be used to determine the actual amount of
- * memory allocated. The caller may use this additional memory, even though
- * a smaller amount of memory was initially specified with the kmalloc call.
+ * allocated memory. The caller may NOT use this additional memory, unless
+ * it calls krealloc(). To avoid an alloc/realloc cycle, callers can use
+ * kmalloc_size_roundup() to find the size of the associated kmalloc bucket.
  * The caller must guarantee that objp points to a valid object previously
  * allocated with either kmalloc() or kmem_cache_alloc(). The object
  * must not be freed during the duration of the call.
@@ -1254,13 +1252,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
  */
 size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 {
-	size_t size;
-
 	/*
-	 * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and
-	 * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is
-	 * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could
-	 * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free.
+	 * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid.
+	 * The KASAN report printed from ksize() is more useful, then when
+	 * it's printed later when the behaviour could be undefined due to
+	 * a potential use-after-free or double-free.
 	 *
 	 * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware
 	 * tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write().
@@ -1274,13 +1270,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp))
 		return 0;
 
-	size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
-	/*
-	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
-	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
-	 */
-	kasan_unpoison_range(objp, size);
-	return size;
+	return kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
 
-- 
2.34.1




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