Hi,
Em Fri, 9 Oct 2020 09:59:26 +0200
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@xxxxxxxx> escreveu:
> Way back it was a reasonable assumptions that iomem mappings never
> change the pfn range they point at. But this has changed:
>
> - gpu drivers dynamically manage their memory nowadays, invalidating
> ptes with unmap_mapping_range when buffers get moved
>
> - contiguous dma allocations have moved from dedicated carvetouts to
> cma regions. This means if we miss the unmap the pfn might contain
> pagecache or anon memory (well anything allocated with GFP_MOVEABLE)
>
> - even /dev/mem now invalidates mappings when the kernel requests that
> iomem region when CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM is set, see 3234ac664a87
> ("/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region")
>
> Accessing pfns obtained from ptes without holding all the locks is
> therefore no longer a good idea.
>
> Unfortunately there's some users where this is not fixable (like v4l
> userptr of iomem mappings) or involves a pile of work (vfio type1
> iommu). For now annotate these as unsafe and splat appropriately.
>
> This patch adds an unsafe_follow_pfn, which later patches will then
> roll out to all appropriate places.
NACK, as this breaks an existing userspace API on media.
While I agree that using the userptr on media is something that
new drivers may not support, as DMABUF is a better way of
handling it, changing this for existing ones is a big no,
as it may break usersapace.
The right approach here would be to be able to fine-tune
support for it on a per-driver basis, e. g. disabling such
feature only for drivers that would use a movable page.
The media subsystem has already a way to disable USERPTR
support from VB2. the right approach would be to ensure
that newer drivers will only set this if they won't use
movable pages.
Regards,
Mauro
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx
> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: linux-samsung-soc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: linux-media@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
> mm/memory.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> mm/nommu.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 2a16631c1fda..ec8c90928fc9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -1653,6 +1653,8 @@ int follow_pte_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
> pte_t **ptepp, pmd_t **pmdpp, spinlock_t **ptlp);
> int follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> unsigned long *pfn);
> +int unsafe_follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> + unsigned long *pfn);
> int follow_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> unsigned int flags, unsigned long *prot, resource_size_t *phys);
> int generic_access_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
> diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
> index f7cbc4dde0ef..7c7b234ffb24 100644
> --- a/mm/memory.c
> +++ b/mm/memory.c
> @@ -4821,7 +4821,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(follow_pte_pmd);
> * @address: user virtual address
> * @pfn: location to store found PFN
> *
> - * Only IO mappings and raw PFN mappings are allowed.
> + * Only IO mappings and raw PFN mappings are allowed. Note that callers must
> + * ensure coherency with pte updates by using a &mmu_notifier to follow updates.
> + * If this is not feasible, or the access to the @pfn is only very short term,
> + * use follow_pte_pmd() instead and hold the pagetable lock for the duration of
> + * the access instead. Any caller not following these requirements must use
> + * unsafe_follow_pfn() instead.
> *
> * Return: zero and the pfn at @pfn on success, -ve otherwise.
> */
> @@ -4844,6 +4849,31 @@ int follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(follow_pfn);
>
> +/**
> + * unsafe_follow_pfn - look up PFN at a user virtual address
> + * @vma: memory mapping
> + * @address: user virtual address
> + * @pfn: location to store found PFN
> + *
> + * Only IO mappings and raw PFN mappings are allowed.
> + *
> + * Returns zero and the pfn at @pfn on success, -ve otherwise.
> + */
> +int unsafe_follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> + unsigned long *pfn)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN
> + pr_info("unsafe follow_pfn usage rejected, see CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> +#else
> + WARN_ONCE(1, "unsafe follow_pfn usage\n");
> + add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
> +
> + return follow_pfn(vma, address, pfn);
> +#endif
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unsafe_follow_pfn);
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT
> int follow_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> unsigned long address, unsigned int flags,
> diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
> index 75a327149af1..3db2910f0d64 100644
> --- a/mm/nommu.c
> +++ b/mm/nommu.c
> @@ -132,6 +132,23 @@ int follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(follow_pfn);
>
> +/**
> + * unsafe_follow_pfn - look up PFN at a user virtual address
> + * @vma: memory mapping
> + * @address: user virtual address
> + * @pfn: location to store found PFN
> + *
> + * Only IO mappings and raw PFN mappings are allowed.
> + *
> + * Returns zero and the pfn at @pfn on success, -ve otherwise.
> + */
> +int unsafe_follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> + unsigned long *pfn)
> +{
> + return follow_pfn(vma, address, pfn);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unsafe_follow_pfn);
> +
> LIST_HEAD(vmap_area_list);
>
> void vfree(const void *addr)
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 7561f6f99f1d..48945402e103 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -230,6 +230,19 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
> If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
> specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
>
> +config STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN
> + bool "Disable unsafe use of follow_pfn"
> + depends on MMU
> + help
> + Some functionality in the kernel follows userspace mappings to iomem
> + ranges in an unsafe matter. Examples include v4l userptr for zero-copy
> + buffers sharing.
> +
> + If this option is switched on, such access is rejected. Only enable
> + this option when you must run userspace which requires this.
> +
> + If in doubt, say Y.
> +
> source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
> source "security/smack/Kconfig"
> source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
Thanks,
Mauro
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