On Thu, 23 Apr 2020 11:21:47 -0700 Rajat Jain <rajatja@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 7:46 AM Pekka Paalanen <ppaalanen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Tue, 21 Apr 2020 14:37:41 +0200 > > Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > TL;DR: Yes there will be races, because of both userspace + > > > the firmware having; and potentially using r/w access to > > > the privacy-screen state. But in practice I expect these > > > to not really be an issue. Important here is that userspace > > > only commits the property in a transaction to commit if > > > it actually intends to change the property so as to not > > > needlessly create a situation where we might hit the race. > > > > > > As for 1 vs 2 properties for this I guess that in preparation > > > for potential devices where the state is locked, having a > > > r/w sw-state + a ro hw-state property makes sense. > > > > > > So I suggest that we replace the current "privacy-screen" property > > > from Rajat's patch-set with 2 props named: > > > > > > "privacy-screen-sw-state" (r/w) > > > "privacy-screen-hw-state" (ro) > > > > > > Where for current gen hardware the privacy-screen-hw-state is > > > just a mirror of the sw-state. > > Just to make sure I understand the semantics correctly: > > - The "privacy-screen-hw-state" shall be read-only, and can be modified by: > - Hardware (e.g. HW kill switch). > - Firmware. > - (Potentially) needs a notification/irq to the kernel when this > changes (or may be kernel can read it only when userspace queries for > it). > > - The "privacy-screen-sw-state" shall be read-write, and can only be > modified by user space. > - If user space toggles it, the kernel will attempt to > "request" the change to hardware. > - Whether the request to hardware was successful or not, the > "privacy-screen-sw-state" will always reflect the latest value > userspace wrote. > - If the request to hardware was successful, the > "privacy-screen-hw-state" will also change (probably via a separate > notification/irq from HW). > - We expect the user space to write to > "privacy-screen-sw-state" only if it really wants to toggle the value. Hi, yes, to my understanding, that seems to be the correct idea from this thread. The hw-state property must reflect the actual hardware state at all times. However, when userspace sets "privacy-screen-sw-state", the driver should attempt to change hardware state regardless of whether the "privacy-screen-sw-state" value changes compared to its old value or not. Otherwise userspace cannot intentionally override a hardware hotkey setting if possible (or would need two atomic commits to do it). Mind, the above paragraph is only what I interpreted from this email thread here. Previously I did not think that with atomic KMS, setting a property to a value it already has could trigger anything. But I guess it can? This design is based on that it can. > What is not clear to me is if any change to"privacy-screen-hw-state" > shall be propagated to "privacy-screen-sw-state"? > - If yes, then I think we are not solving any problems of single property. > - If no, then why do we require userspace to write to sw state only > if something has changed? No. As already written, the kernel must not change the value of "privacy-screen-sw-state", only userspace can. Let's assume that you have a firmware-implemented hardware hotkey for toggling the shield. The driver also successfully implements "privacy-screen-sw-state" meaning that writing to it will set the hardware shield state. If userspace was writing "privacy-screen-sw-state" even when it does not intend to change hardware state, it would almost immediately override any state set by the hardware hotkey, making the hardware hotkey (randomly) not work. This assumes that the hardware hotkey is a momentary switch that does not stop software from controlling the shield too. If the hardware hotkey can stop software from changing the shield state, then it might not be necessary for userspace to avoid unneeded setting of the property. But that depends on which way the hotkey works and which way users want to use it, so it's still best for userspace to not set the property unless it really intends to apply a change. If possible, it would be good to make this case the prime example of how to correctly implement KMS properties for a hardware feature that can be controlled (and fought over) by both userspace and hardware/firmware. It seems like the same design can also work with hardware switches that force the hardware state to be one or the other, stopping userspace from changing it. Therefore I'd avoid incorporating any specific shield use cases in the design, e.g. "if hw switch is set to shield-on, userspace cannot turn shield off". Thanks, pq > > Also, it seems to me that in my current patchset, the property I have > already behaves like "privacy-screen-sw-state". Do I just need to > rename it? > > Thanks, > > Rajat
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