On 2021-02-08 12:45 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
Hi Tushar,
On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 16:45 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
IMA needs to support duplicate measurements of integrity
critical data to accurately determine the current state of that data
on the system. Further, since measurement of duplicate data is not
required for all the use cases, it needs to be policy driven.
Define "allow_dup", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func
CRITICAL_DATA to allow duplicate buffer measurement of integrity
critical data.
Limit the ability to measure duplicate buffer data when action is
"measure" and func is CRITICAL_DATA.
Why?!
I wasn't sure if it would break any use-case by supporting this for all
the files / buffers. That's why I only wanted to address the scenario
that we discussed in the last series (critical data measurement).
But as you suggested in this series' cover letter response, I am happy
to extend it to other scenarios (by disabling "htable" using new Kconfig
(e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 9b45d064a87d..b89eb768dd05 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
#define IMA_LABEL 0x0800
+#define IMA_ALLOW_DUP 0x1000
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
char *fsname;
struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
struct ima_rule_opt_list *label; /* Measure data grouped under this label */
Defining a new boolean entry shouldn't be necessary. The other
boolean values are just stored in "flags".
Thanks. Will do the same here.
Thanks,
Tushar
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
thanks,
Mimi
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