Hi Tushar,
On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 16:45 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> IMA needs to support duplicate measurements of integrity
> critical data to accurately determine the current state of that data
> on the system. Further, since measurement of duplicate data is not
> required for all the use cases, it needs to be policy driven.
>
> Define "allow_dup", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func
> CRITICAL_DATA to allow duplicate buffer measurement of integrity
> critical data.
>
> Limit the ability to measure duplicate buffer data when action is
> "measure" and func is CRITICAL_DATA.
Why?!
>
> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 9b45d064a87d..b89eb768dd05 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
> #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
> #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
> #define IMA_LABEL 0x0800
> +#define IMA_ALLOW_DUP 0x1000
>
> #define UNKNOWN 0
> #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
> @@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> char *fsname;
> struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
> struct ima_rule_opt_list *label; /* Measure data grouped under this label */
Defining a new boolean entry shouldn't be necessary. The other
boolean values are just stored in "flags".
> struct ima_template_desc *template;
> };
thanks,
Mimi
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