Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] crypto: switch to shash for ESSIV generation

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On Mon, 17 Jun 2019 at 12:58, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 17 Jun 2019 at 12:39, Milan Broz <gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On 17/06/2019 11:15, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > >> I will also add that going the skcipher route rather than shash will
> > >> allow hardware tfm providers like CryptoCell that can do the ESSIV
> > >> part in hardware implement that as a single API call and/or hardware
> > >> invocation flow.
> > >> For those system that benefit from hardware providers this can be beneficial.
> > >>
> > >
> > > Ah yes, thanks for reminding me. There was some debate in the past
> > > about this, but I don't remember the details.
> > >
> > > I think implementing essiv() as a skcipher template is indeed going to
> > > be the best approach, I will look into that.
> >
> > For ESSIV (that is de-facto standard now), I think there is no problem
> > to move it to crypto API.
> >
> > The problem is with some other IV generators in dm-crypt.
> >
> > Some do a lot of more work than just IV (it is hackish, it can modify data, this applies
> > for loop AES "lmk" and compatible TrueCrypt "tcw" IV implementations).
> >
> > For these I would strongly say it should remain "hacked" inside dm-crypt only
> > (it is unusable for anything else than disk encryption and should not be visible outside).
> >
> > Moreover, it is purely legacy code - we provide it for users can access old systems only.
> >
> > If you end with rewriting all IVs as templates, I think it is not a good idea.
> >
> > If it is only about ESSIV, and patch for dm-crypt is simple, it is a reasonable approach.
> >
> > (The same applies for simple dmcryp IVs like "plain" "plain64", "plain64be and "benbi" that
> > are just linear IVs in various encoded variants.)
> >
>
> Agreed.
>
> I am mostly only interested in ensuring that the bare 'cipher'
> interface is no longer used outside of the crypto subsystem itself.
> Since ESSIV is the only one using that, ESSIV is the only one I intend
> to change.

OK, so inferring the block cipher name from the skcipher algo name is
a bit finicky, since the dm-crypt code does that *after* allocating
the TFMs, and allocating the essiv skcipher happens before.
But more importantly, it appears to be allowed currently to use ESSIV
with authenticated modes, which means we'd need both a skcipher and a
aead essiv template, or do some non-trivial hacking to insert the
essiv template in the right place (which I'm not sure is even
possible)

So my main question/showstopper at the moment is: which modes do we
need to support for ESSIV? Only CBC? Any skcipher? Or both skciphers
and AEADs?

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