LUKS2 and persistent keyrings to enable convenient EOL data destruction

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



The example by fossies (here:
https://fossies.org/linux/cryptsetup/docs/Keyring.txt ) shows how to
create a key bound to the thread keyring: the key is not persistent
across sessions.

In my model, I am concerned about threats post disposal of the
underlying device.  I also require unattended startup during the
in-use lifetime (e.g. no manual passphrase entry).  Finally, I need
rapid data destruction (e.g. faster than overwriting the underlying
media).

One conceivable design is to use LUKS2-encrypted storage with a token
linked to a persistent keyring (e.g. persistent across reboots).  Data
destruction would be cost-effectively achieved by destroying the
master-passphrase.

I note that there is a kernel feature for persistent keyrings, but
such keyrings are not accessible to users (only authorized processes).
 Is there a way to create a persistent token for this purpose?

Question:
Can someone provide a line-by-line example of how to unlock a LUKS2
container using a persistent token, if indeed it is  possible to do
so.

An alternative design could be to place a key on removable media (also
problematic; see separate post).  I would like to understand
persistent tokens regardless.

Many thanks.




_______________________________________________
dm-crypt mailing list
dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx
https://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt



[Index of Archives]     [Device Mapper Devel]     [Fedora Desktop]     [ATA RAID]     [Fedora Marketing]     [Fedora Packaging]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Yosemite News]     [KDE Users]     [Fedora Tools]     [Fedora Docs]

  Powered by Linux