Re: dm-crypt overhead

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Hi LUkas,

sounds like you are in a really dysfunctional (security-wise)
corporate environment. Maybe your time would be better
spend trying to fix that...

Regards,
Arno

On Thu, Mar 01, 2018 at 22:20:36 CET, Lukáš Pohanka wrote:
>    Milan,
>    thank you very much for a useful and informative answer. I'll have a
>    look at this.
>    Maybe I have a one more question: which part requires the 4.12+ kernel?
>    I'm afraid I'll have to backport the changes if we decide to proceed.
>    Thanks again,
>    Lukas
> 
>    2018-03-01 18:41 GMT+01:00 Milan Broz <[1]gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx>:
> 
>      On 03/01/2018 03:59 PM, Lukáš Pohanka wrote:
>      > thanks for clarifications. Unfortunately, we are currently
>      > constrained to use only dmsetup and cannot provision the target
>      > device with cryptsetup. Thus we cannot use LUKS, only plain
>      > dm-crypt. Hopefully it will change in the future. However, does
>      this
>      > mean there is currently no chance of using any form of
>      authenticated
>      > encryption in our case?
>      Hi,
>      you can use it just with dmsetup, but there are several steps that
>      are not obvious (for example formatting dm-integrity device requires
>      two steps etc).
>      But it is definitely something I would not suggest :-)
>      So in general (I intentionally do not want to paste exact commands,
>      you have to be sure what you are doing here):
>      - you will need recent-enough kernel (4.12+)
>      Formatting (only once):
>      - prepare block device, wipe first megabytes with zeroes
>      - activate dm-integrity device (using dm-setup) with size 8 sectors,
>      and with proper parameters (mainly tag size per sector) you need (do
>      not use internal hash)
>      - deactivate dm-integrity device
>      (Steps above will format the device in-kernel, writing integrity
>      superblock.)
>      Later use (normal activation):
>      - activate dm-integrity device with proper data size (read from
>      dm-integrity
>      superblock). (In future it will be simpler.)
>      - activate dm-crypt device with proper parameters above the
>      dm-itegrity device
>      (with proper authentication mode parameters, tag size, random IV
>      etc)
>      - Profit. (Use top-level dm-crypt device as usual.)
>      (You should probably overwrite the whole device using direct-io on
>      the first
>      activation to initialize auth.tags.
>      Otherwise any reads, including page cache, will fail on -EILSEQ -
>      integrity error.)
>      The above is in principle what crypstestup is doing for you.
>      Authenticated filesystem is definitely better idea, but because I
>      can
>      guess in which environment you are trying to implement
>      this I guess it is not an option...
>      Milan
> 
> References
> 
>    1. mailto:gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx

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-- 
Arno Wagner,     Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform.,    Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718  FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF  B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
----
A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier
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