Re: LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of AF-keyslot bit errors

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 24 Apr 2017 18:00 +0100, from dominic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Dominic Raferd):
> Is there any possibility that a malicious third party (disgruntled
> ex-sysadmin perhaps) gained root access to the machine during its last
> session and changed the passphrase?

Does that not require knowledge of a current passphrase? I believe it
does. Which of course said third party _could_ have.

> As an aside, of no help to OP I'm afraid: is a prior backup of the
> LUKS header a protection against this scenario (i.e. against a
> subsequently deleted, or changed and now unknown, passphrase)?

Yes. A copy of the LUKS header and a passphrase that was valid at the
time the header copy was made will allow access, as long as the master
key is unchanged (no cryptsetup-reencrypt in the interim). The only
way to mitigate this threat AFAIK is to change the master key of the
container.

-- 
Michael Kjörling • https://michael.kjorling.se • michael@xxxxxxxxxxx
                 “People who think they know everything really annoy
                 those of us who know we don’t.” (Bjarne Stroustrup)
_______________________________________________
dm-crypt mailing list
dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx
http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt




[Index of Archives]     [Device Mapper Devel]     [Fedora Desktop]     [ATA RAID]     [Fedora Marketing]     [Fedora Packaging]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Yosemite News]     [KDE Users]     [Fedora Tools]     [Fedora Docs]

  Powered by Linux