Am 15.11.2016 um 16:18 schrieb Robert Nichols:
On 11/15/2016 07:32 AM, Sven Eschenberg wrote:
Obviously it is not a bug in cryptsetup, but rather in dracut and some
distributions initrd scripts. What's really annoying about the CVE is
the fact, that it is mostly irrelevant. If I can get to the password
entry of an initrd, I obviously have control over the boot process. If I
do have control over the boot process I have a splendid variety of
options to do all the things described in the CVE.
I wonder why the authors of the CVE recommend to freeze the system,
instead of adding auth to get a shell. Seems quite stupid to completely
remove the ability to investigate problems.
The boot process can be configured to deny that control (BIOS configured
to boot from the internal drive only, GRUB set up to require a password
for all except the default selection).
Interesting, haven't seen any such firmware so far for PC. A firmware
that indeed can disable the bootmenu etc. whilst not requiring a
password during boot would be the one exception of course.
Most firmwares will actually happily boot the configured port, even when
the device is switched over, with one exception: Secure Boot with a
uniquely signed bootloader and a unique key installed in the firmware.
(Requires a non vendor key).
On a Red Hat system with an encrypted root filesystem, I get 5 attempts
to enter the encryption password. Then the system locks up, and the only
options are to (a) press <ESC> to dismiss the graphical boot screen and
see a "wrong password" message, and/or (b) press CTRL-ALT-DEL to reboot.
I'm still considering this a stupid approach, I prefer a sulogin with
auth approach and happily live with it.
-Sven
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