On Fri, Feb 05, 2016 at 07:30:50 CET, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote: > On jeu., 2016-02-04 at 18:17 +0100, Arno Wagner wrote: > > Maybe my crypto-knowledge deserts me here, but how is that > > relevant for storage encryption? > > > > If somebody can replay old storage blocks, they have already > > compromised your machine and can do what they want, > > Think external drives / removable storage? An attacker with physical access that you do not notice has won. Storage encryption does not protect here. Think, for example, "evil maid" type attacks. Storage encryption is only for theft of the device (which you notice) or attacker access which you notice in other ways. Regards, Arno > > > > And authenticated encryption seems to not even apply to storage, > > unless you are thinking about integrity. > > Indeed. > > > If so, wrong project, > > as integrity always requires additional bits and LUKS/DM-cryopt > > does not have them bu design. > > I am well aware of the need to store the integrity patterns, that's why I'm > asking this in context of LUKS2. Thanks for the reply though. > > Regards, > -- > Yves-Alexis > > _______________________________________________ > dm-crypt mailing list > dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx > http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of "news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
