On Tue Feb 15 10:54:35 CET 2011, Milan Broz wrote: [Cold Boot attacks] > Moreover, this attacks also include "platform reset" attack when you > simply reset device and store memory image, because the power was > still present, there is no memory loss (except few pages for image > tool). Hi, sorry for the late reply... but I've been wondering if these attacks - rebooting the device into some kind of imaging tool for retrieving the memory image with the encryption key - can't be prevented by storing the key in a place in memory where it would be inevitably overwritten by the contents of the boot media. Obviously this wouldn't stop the kind of attacks where the cooled RAM is being read in some kind of external device, but it would surely make attacks more expensive. Hanno _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
