On Sun, Aug 15, 2010 at 07:26:44PM +0200, Uwe Menges wrote: > On 07/27/2010 01:42 AM, Mario 'BitKoenig' Holbe wrote: > > Of course, your attacker has to be able to capture a snapshot after the > > first fill-up ... probably via some forensic magic - people who believe > > in encryption often tend to also still believe in Peter Gutmann :) > > No forensic magic is needed if you are eg. using a LUKS crypted iSCSI > volume and the attacker is able to mirror you network traffic. > > Cheers, Uwe Well, if the attacker mirrors your network traffic with iSCSI, encryption does not matter anymore for any change analysis. But using such a set-up wpuld be pretty stupid anayways.... ;-) Arno -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx GnuPG: ID: 1E25338F FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C 0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F ---- Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of "news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
