Re: Support for Deniable encryption (Hidden containers)

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En réponse à Arno Wagner <arno@xxxxxxxxxxx> :
> ------------------ Début du message d'origine --------------------
> 
> Yes, that works. You should also make sure to change the
> things in the first container from time to time (but be 
> very careful to not overwrite the second one), because 
> otherwise the timestamps will show you did not actually
> used the first one and its back to waterboarding for you.
> 
Yes. Typical excuse is: "Oh, yes, I've tried to use crypto
but it's painfully hard to use, so I didn't continue to use 
it anymore. All files are two years old? Yes, that's what I 
said. The password? I think it's 'test' or 'password' or '1234' 
because it was only for a test."

> You also better be able to explain "Why fat"?
>
You can respond:
"I was thinking about using it under windows with
http://www.freeotfe.org/ , so I use FAT."

> "Why did you overwrite the whole container with 
> random data?"

You can respond:
"
The doc http://www.saout.de/tikiwiki/tiki-index.php?page=EncryptedDevice
says to fill it with random data, so I did"

> "Why encryopt in the first place?"

You can respond:
"I was just trying using it. I also use several progs and apps 
because I'm a geek. cryptsetup did not convince me, so
I don't use it anymore. Why I didn't rm the 1gigabyte 
crypted file? My Hard drive is 250Gig, I have plenty of 
free space, why should I bother?"

> and use cryptographically
> strong randomness to fill the container.
> 
Something like
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/crypt
should be enough. You can't differenciate AES ciphered 
data from randomness. If so, this is huge problem.

> Arno
> 
thanks for the feedback.

> On Mon, Mar 01, 2010 at 05:22:15PM +0100, octane indice wrote:
> > Ther is a way to have some plausible deniability with
> cryptsetup (not LUKS).
> > 
> > Basically, all resides with the ability of losetup to have
> an offset (i.e.
> > jump a certain number of bytes in the beginning of the loop
> file). Create a
> > LUKS container, don't fill it too much, jump behind the last
> data and create
> > a second one:
> > 
> > First, the ciphered one, known file:
> > dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/bigfile bs=1024k count=1024
> > losetup /dev/loop0 /tmp/bigfile
> > cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/loop0
> > cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/loop0 crypted_one
> >   (fill the disk with random data)
> > mkdosfs -F 32 /dev/mapper/crypted_one
> > mount -t vfat /dev/mapper/crypted_one /mnt/crypt
> > echo "confidential file" > /mnt/crypt/secret
> > 
> > Second, hide your real secrets with plausible deniability:
> > losetup -o 512000 /dev/loop1 /tmp/bigfile
> > cryptsetup create second_crypt /dev/loop1
> > mke2fs /dev/mapper/second_crypt
> > mount -t ext2 /dev/mapper/second_crypt /mnt/hd2
> > echo "very very secret" > /mnt/hd2/secret
> > 
> > 
> > You must be careful to don't use too much the crypted_one;
> if you fill it
> > too much it will overwrite the second_crypt...
> > You _must_ use the FAT filesystem in the crypted_one
> partition: ext copy the
> > superblock everywhere on the disk. It will be overwritten by
> the
> > second_crypt, and therefore an attacker with the first key
> can be
> suspicious...
> > You mustn't use LUKS for second_crypt: the format of LUKS
> header can be
> > found very easily in the middle of the /tmp/bigfile
> > 
> > The secret lies with two parameters: the offset and the key.
> 
> > 
> > I think we can call it plausible deniabilty: It is
> impossible for an
> > attacker to know that a second container resides in the
> first one.
> > 
> > Hope this helps
> > 
> > En r?ponse ? Ond??ej Pelech <ondra.pelech@xxxxxxxxx> :
> > > ------------------ D?but du message d'origine
> --------------------
> > > 
> > > Hello,
> > > 
> > > dm-crypt is a great project, but it seems to me, that it's
> > > missing one
> > > very needed feature - Deniable encryption[0] (support for
> > > hidden
> > > containers).
> > > will it be possible to do this (1 vault, many keys, each
> > > reveals
> > > something "different") in future using dm-crypt? are there
> any
> > > plans
> > > to support this feature?
> > > 
> > > Best regards
> > > 
> > > Ondra Pelech
> > > 
> > > [0] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > dm-crypt mailing list
> > > dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx
> > > http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
> > > 
> > > ------------------- Fin du message d'origine
> ---------------------
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Envoy? avec Inmano, ma messagerie renversante et gratuite :
> http://www.inmano.com
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > dm-crypt mailing list
> > dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx
> > http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
> > 
> 
> -- 
> Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email:
> arno@xxxxxxxxxxx 
> GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F
> 6B50 1E25 338F
> ----
> Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. --
> Dylan Evans
> 
> If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very
> definition of 
> "news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce
> Schneier 
> 
> ------------------- Fin du message d'origine ---------------------




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