Heinz Diehl wrote:
On 29.12.2009, Arno Wagner wrote:
I don't agree. But you have to think outside of the box and use a
separate, uncompromised boot medium that the attacker did not have
access to.
Sorry, but I can't see how this would help. The attacker installs a
hardware keylogger and just doesn't care.
I don't see the averae script kiddie install a hardware keylogger in a
modern laptop.
If you have an intelligence agency after you you're screwed anyway.
They'll use a tempest attack or something so you won't even notice that
you gave them your password (I don't have a tempest proof room in my
house, perhaps other people have?).
So it's a matter of security management. For highly confidential data
you need ($$$) a tempest proof environment with armed guards. For only
slightly sensitive data, simple disk encryption and some measures
against script kiddies are usually enough.
Olivier
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