Re: Mechanics

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On Wed, Dec 02, 2009 at 02:51:47PM +0100, julie_nuckey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> Thanks for the information, but I was hoping for a little more detail.
> 
> I really want to know if it possible for the password/key to be exposed in
> the process of transferring it from user mode to kernel mode, or if it
> could remain in memory as a result, that's why I'm asking about the
> mechanics of what happens between cryptsetup (user mode) and dm-crypt
> (kernel mode).

That really depens on how careful the user-space tool was designed
and what the attacker can do. I think cryptsetup uses locked memory
and wipes it afterwards. That is about all the user space application
can do.

Note however that a root attacker can get the key from kernel space
anyways. Some attacks on DVD encryption have used this (non Linux,
but same principle).

> In "plain" mode the password must be passed to the kernel, but in LUKS
> mode, the password is used to decrypt the master key which is in the
> kernel. 

The master key is on disk in the LUKS header. It is unpacked
by the userspace tool and then give to the kernel, just as a 
user-typed key would be.

> If cryptsetup is user mode only, what exactly does the kernel mode
> decryption of the master key? Can't be dm-crypt as this doesn't know
> anything about LUKS.

Indeed. See above.

> BTW, sorry about the missing line breaks, don't know what happened there. I'll remember
> to put in hard ones in future.

Thanks. Many browser-type mailers also have a config option to
do that automatically. If you have the option, go for <= 72 chars/line.

Arno
 






> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dm-crypt-bounces@xxxxxxxx [mailto:dm-crypt-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Arno Wagner
> Sent: 02 December 2009 12:21
> To: dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re:  Mechanics
> 
> On Wed, Dec 02, 2009 at 12:20:31PM +0100, julie_nuckey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> >
> > I'm trying to understand the mechanics of how dm-crypt and cryptsetup
> > work, in particular how data such as the password/key-file data is passed
> > from user mode to kernel mode, and also generally what does what when
> > setting up an encrypted volume.
> > 
> >
> > 
> > As I understand it, dm-crypt is a pure kernel-mode application that does
> > the encryption and decryption of data on the fly. It works independently
> > of any on-disk format such as metadata like that used by LUKS. Have I got
> > that right?
> 
> Yes. It will happily de-/encrypt random data. No checking at all, not
> a single bit of metadata. Incidentially a dm-crypt volume (after
> an encrypted overwrite) is indistinguishable for a volume wiped
> with cryptographically strong randomness. In fact I use dm-crypt
> to wipe disks: 
>  1.) Set-up with random key (from /dev/random)
>  2.) Overwrite with weak randomness or zeros.
>   
>  
> > And cryptsetup is the pure user-mode application and this can work in
> > "plain" mode, ie without LUKS, or in LUKS mode. Is that right? So how does
> > the password/key get from cryptsetup (user mode) to dm-crypt (kernel mode)
> > and does it differ depending on whether I'm using plain or LUKS mode? Does
> > it use tables? Is the password/key written to the tables?
>  
> My guess would be that the key data is basically the same as for
> directly using ciphers in the kernel. Some call will transfer them.
> No idea about the details, but dm-crypt is basically a device mapper
> target and should use the same mechanisms. The device mapper page
> at http://sources.redhat.com/dm/ may have more information.
>    
> > In LUKS mode, does cryptsetup generate the master key? In user mode? Does
> > cryptsetup create/edit the metadata?
> 
> Yes, AFAIK. The kernel does not understand LUKS.
>   
> > Thanks in advance for any clarification anyone can provide.
> 
> Side note: What about linebreaks? It is not nice to have to reformat
> your message before answering...
> 
> 
> Arno
> 
> 
> -- 
> Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx 
> GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
> ----
> Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans
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-- 
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx 
GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier 
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