Re: Mechanics

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Thanks for the information, but I was hoping for a little more detail.

I really want to know if it possible for the password/key to be exposed in the process
of transferring it from user mode to kernel mode, or if it could remain in memory as
a result, that's why I'm asking about the mechanics of what happens between cryptsetup
(user mode) and dm-crypt (kernel mode).

In "plain" mode the password must be passed to the kernel, but in LUKS mode, the 
password is used to decrypt the master key which is in the kernel. If cryptsetup is 
user mode only, what exactly does the kernel mode decryption of the master key? Can't
be dm-crypt as this doesn't know anything about LUKS.

BTW, sorry about the missing line breaks, don't know what happened there. I'll remember
to put in hard ones in future.


-----Original Message-----
From: dm-crypt-bounces@xxxxxxxx [mailto:dm-crypt-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Arno Wagner
Sent: 02 December 2009 12:21
To: dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx
Subject: Re:  Mechanics

On Wed, Dec 02, 2009 at 12:20:31PM +0100, julie_nuckey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
> I'm trying to understand the mechanics of how dm-crypt and cryptsetup
> work, in particular how data such as the password/key-file data is passed
> from user mode to kernel mode, and also generally what does what when
> setting up an encrypted volume.
> 
>
> 
> As I understand it, dm-crypt is a pure kernel-mode application that does
> the encryption and decryption of data on the fly. It works independently
> of any on-disk format such as metadata like that used by LUKS. Have I got
> that right?

Yes. It will happily de-/encrypt random data. No checking at all, not
a single bit of metadata. Incidentially a dm-crypt volume (after
an encrypted overwrite) is indistinguishable for a volume wiped
with cryptographically strong randomness. In fact I use dm-crypt
to wipe disks: 
 1.) Set-up with random key (from /dev/random)
 2.) Overwrite with weak randomness or zeros.
  
 
> And cryptsetup is the pure user-mode application and this can work in
> "plain" mode, ie without LUKS, or in LUKS mode. Is that right? So how does
> the password/key get from cryptsetup (user mode) to dm-crypt (kernel mode)
> and does it differ depending on whether I'm using plain or LUKS mode? Does
> it use tables? Is the password/key written to the tables?
 
My guess would be that the key data is basically the same as for
directly using ciphers in the kernel. Some call will transfer them.
No idea about the details, but dm-crypt is basically a device mapper
target and should use the same mechanisms. The device mapper page
at http://sources.redhat.com/dm/ may have more information.
   
> In LUKS mode, does cryptsetup generate the master key? In user mode? Does
> cryptsetup create/edit the metadata?

Yes, AFAIK. The kernel does not understand LUKS.
  
> Thanks in advance for any clarification anyone can provide.

Side note: What about linebreaks? It is not nice to have to reformat
your message before answering...


Arno


-- 
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx 
GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
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"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier 
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