On 10.08.2009, Luca Berra wrote: > To achieve this, they will have to hand it back, wait for you to type > your password to boot, then steal it again :P I was nearly clear over that, but had to ask anyway, because it was so many disinformation. I did read that "stoned" could hook into the BIOS and capture some traffic from there which should be enough to get access to the key. I just couldn't believe that this is possible when the machine is powered off. Besides, I'm not using Truecrypt at all (since I do not use Windows), but my thoughts went almost immediately to LUKS/dmcrypt. I always power my Laptop completely down when no longer in use, after my former one got stolen I'm somewhat sensible now. (There's my online bank account, a lot of business email, letters, documents and so on...). > Truecrypt developers said that was a moot point, because, if someone is > able to replace the boot sector it could well replace the code that > checks its integrity. ..which is not true, of course. I can e.g. have a copy of the boot sector/MBR on a memory stick, together with a checksum file of /boot. Copying the first 512 bytes and checking it against the checksum of the known good bootsector on the memory stick will detect any manipulation immediately. A simple "dd if=mbr_copy of=/dev/sda bs=512 count=1" will cure the problem. _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
