On 05/22/2011 09:20 PM, Amir 'CG' Caspi wrote:
Lorenzo,
Also, does your patch pass the requested login name to saslauthd? I didn't
see that it did. That would also be a great inclusion, so we could exclude
dictionary attacks from potentially legitimate users. Certainly not as
crucial as the remote IP, though.
I've updated my RHEL bug to include a link to your patch - hopefully we can
get it included upstream (especially if one of them applies cleanly to 2.1.22).
Thanks!
Amir,
I just checked the 2.1.23 patch applies with just some line shift
to 2.1.22. I have no handy way to test it and I have no experience with
SRMPs, specs and the like, since my systems are debian based. I'd be VERY
grateful if you could try yourself to create a patched RPM for a test
system of yours!
As for the "pass the requested login name", saslauthd does know the login
name, as it must be passed to the auth handlers; if you set the syslog
level for the authpriv syslog destination to debug, you'll be able to see
lines like the following ones:
May 23 09:53:36 test saslauthd[28570]: pam_unix(svc:auth): check pass; user
unknown
May 23 09:53:36 test saslauthd[28570]: pam_unix(svc:auth): authentication
failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty= ruser= rhost=127.0.0.1 **
May 23 09:53:38 test saslauthd[28570]: DEBUG: auth_pam: pam_authenticate
failed: Authentication failure
May 23 09:53:38 test saslauthd[28570]: do_auth : auth failure:
[user=cg] [service=svc] [realm=] [remote=127.0.0.1;42002] [mech=pam]
[reason=PAM auth error] **
Since that is the default configuration on my systems, I didn't get
the problematic * line, since all you need is shown in **.
I don't make any promise, but I'll try to understand this glitch.
Thank you very much, yours
lorenzo
