Jari Ruusu wrote:
Info wrote:
Although I will agree that this provides a great deal of security for the
data I don't think that it provides 'deniability'. In particular if the
attack consists of physical possession of the computer and an analysis of
the disk drive content without the attempt to boot it,
After handing over the passphrase to /dev/hda2 root partition, all hard disk
space is accounted for. Files on /dev/hda1 and /dev/hda2 are readable, and
user can prove that programs on /dev/hda2 root partition create random
encryption keys for /dev/hda3 and /dev/hda4 on each boot, and that user has
no way of knowing what earlier encryption keys were on those two partitions.
and even more so if the usb key is available to the attacker.
Here user insists that /dev/hda2 is the root partition. That way all hard
disk space is accounted for. Attacker can prove existence of one small gpg
encrypted file on USB-stick for which user has forgotten passphrase.
That just doesn't fly with for e.g. when you computer is sized by the
police when you are away from home.
In a german magazine there was an article about disc duplication that
was written by someone from the police.
They NEVER would boot a computer, as it is, after they sized it.
They take out the HDD and make a backup of it and only operate on these
backups, then the computer and the original HDD(s) is locked away.
(The article was about the time and storage space it takes to make these
kind of duplications of hard discs)
If you encrypted you computer right(tm) they woun't be able to break it,
but the "self destruct" won't work either.
Bis denn
--
Real Programmers consider "what you see is what you get" to be just as
bad a concept in Text Editors as it is in women. No, the Real Programmer
wants a "you asked for it, you got it" text editor -- complicated,
cryptic, powerful, unforgiving, dangerous.
-
Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
