Alle 00:13, lunedì 10 ottobre 2005, Matthias Schniedermeyer ha scritto: > I'd say the easiest 90-95% solution would be to NOT store the key on > the target system, but to get it from a server under YOUR control (so > you can be e.g. sure the clock is correct) everytime the filesystem > is mounted. > In the easiest setup [...] > > ssh <...> <programm/script which outputs key> | mount -p0 ... This is the solution I choose to adopt. :-) The only problem is to write down a good bash script. Thanks. Alle 18:43, lunedì 10 ottobre 2005, Jari Ruusu ha scritto: > Because the "head ... | uuencode ... | head ... | tail ..." pipe > sends a random passphrase to stdin of losetup. By default, losetup > prompts and reads a passphrase from controlling terminal, not stdin. > If losetup is given a "-p0" command line parameter, then losetup > reads a passphrase from stdin. Thanks, all clear about this question. If you want, can explain me this procedure (from loopAES.README - Example 2): head -c 15 /dev/urandom | uuencode -m - | head -n 2 | tail -n 1 \ | losetup -p 0 -e AES128 /dev/loop3 /dev/hda666 dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/loop3 bs=4k conv=notrunc 2>/dev/null The first encrypt the block device /dev/hda666 using a random passphrase then, the second, fill all the partition with all zero. Is it right? The scope is to create a "base" on which write the encrypted data? All this to increase the safety of data encryption? Thanks again. - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/