Re: Loop-AES, security concerns, stability of file backed loop-aes

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Christian Kujau wrote:
> to access the ciphertext, the attacker must have access to the
> (encrypted) partition / imagefile, right?

Yes, access to ciphertext usually needs root privileges. If attacker can get
root, it is game over right there.

> i too think that "100% secure" is never possible, because of a lot of
> things. but i also thought, loop-aes aims to be "quite secure", when it
> comes to "the bad|good guys seize my harddisk". hm, but then they really
> *have* access to the bare partitions and so they have access to the
> ciphertext too and your mentioned ciphertext attacks are frightening me now.

Like I said before, loop-AES (and cryptoloop and dm-crypt) does not
authenticate ciphertext. It is ok to let attacker get copies of ciphertext
and software, but it not ok to let attacker modify ciphertext or software
prior to legitimate user using those ciphertext or software.

-- 
Jari Ruusu  1024R/3A220F51 5B 4B F9 BB D3 3F 52 E9  DB 1D EB E3 24 0E A9 DD

-
Linux-crypto:  cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive:       http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/


[Index of Archives]     [Kernel]     [Linux Crypto]     [Gnu Crypto]     [Gnu Classpath]     [Netfilter]     [Bugtraq]
  Powered by Linux