Re: [PATCH -next 2/2] cgroup: Disallow delegatee to write all interfaces outsize of cgroup ns

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Hello,

On Wed, Aug 14, 2024 at 04:09:59PM +0800, chenridong wrote:
...
> Hi,TJ, We plan to use delegation in cgroup-v2, so I am conducting some
> tests.
> As doc mentions 'Because the resource control interface files in a given
> directory control the distribution of the parent's resources, the delegatee
> shouldn't be allowed to write to them.' However I found a root can write
> parent's file(cgroup.subtree_control) to change the resource limits(a
> fraudulent method). I believe this could pose a risk in some scenarios where
> a root enters a new cgroup ns without unmounting original cgroup system, and
> it can break limitations. For instance, running a docker with --privileged,
> could this be a risk?
> 
> So I sent this patch to discuss whether this case should be addressed?

That sounsd like a misconfiguration. cgroup NS doesn't make much sense if
you don't limit the actual visibility. The interface is half broken in that
situation anyway and if you're leaking filesystem visibility into a
supposedly isolated container, relaxed resource limits aren't biggest of
your problems.

While the proposed change isn't necessarily a bad idea, it's a behavior
change and I don't either modifying existing behavior or introducing a new
mount flag is justified here. Maybe just update the documentation indicating
that the ancestral cgroups shouldn't be visible in a delegated ns?

Thanks.

-- 
tejun




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