Hi Sage, thanks for your answer. Am I right, that the communication between nodes that support cephx signatures is still signed, although the option is set to false? So only the communication between the client, mapping the rbd, and the relevant OSDs and MONs is not signed? Thanks, best regards, Kurt Sage Weil schrieb: > Hi Kurt, > > Your original analysis is correct: cephx signatures aren't yet implemented > in the kernel client. I don't have a good indication of when this will be > prioritized, unfortunately. > > I'm not aware of anybody who has targetted this or has even made note of > the potential vulnerability. It requires someone to hijack the TCP > session in order to take advantage of it (e.g., MITM), though, so there > are many environments where it is not a big concern. > > sage > > > On Mon, 10 Feb 2014, Kurt Bauer wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> I found two maybe related bugs in the tracker (#4287, #3657) but both are >> resolved, so I'm wondering if there's spmething I'm doing wrong. >> Has anybody sucessfully mapped rbd images with kernel rbd, when cephx >> require signatures is set to true in the cluster? >> >> Thanks for your help, >> best regards, >> Kurt >> >> Kurt Bauer schrieb: >> Hi, >> >> I have to "open" our CEPH cluster for some clients, that only >> support kernel rbd. In general that's no problem and works just >> fine (verified in our test-cluster ;-) ). I then tried to map >> images from our production cluster and failed: rbd: add failed: >> (95) Operation not supported >> After some testing and comparing test and production cluster, it >> turned out that the config option, that hinders the kernel to >> map the image is cephx require signatures = true >> If I read the documentation(http://ceph.com/docs/master/rados/operations/authentication/#backward-comp >> atibility) correctly that flag is recommended, which leads to >> two questions: >> 1. When will cephx signatures make it to kernel rbd (it's not >> there till at least 3.12.0 and I've found no reference in the >> changelogs of subsequent versions) ? >> 2. As I have to assess the risk when disabling cephx signatures, >> do you have some estimations how probable a "real life" attack >> is, ie. are there real threats for the whole infrastructure or >> is it "just" possible to disturb the communication of exactly >> that client in whose communication malicious messages are forced >> ? >> >> Thanks a lot for your help, >> best regards, >> Kurt >> >> PS.: If my conclusion is correct, maybe that should be mentioned >> somewhere at http://ceph.com/docs/master/rbd/rbd-ko/ >> >> -- >> Kurt Bauer <kurt.bauer@xxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Vienna University Computer Center - ACOnet - VIX >> Universitaetsstrasse 7, A-1010 Vienna, Austria, Europe >> Tel: ++43 1 4277 - 14070 (Fax: - 814070) KB1970-RIPE >> >> _______________________________________________ >> ceph-users mailing list >> ceph-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> http://lists.ceph.com/listinfo.cgi/ceph-users-ceph.com >> >> >> -- >> Kurt Bauer <kurt.bauer@xxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Vienna University Computer Center - ACOnet - VIX >> Universitaetsstrasse 7, A-1010 Vienna, Austria, Europe >> Tel: ++43 1 4277 - 14070 (Fax: - 9140) KB1970-RIPE >> -- Kurt Bauer <kurt.bauer@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Vienna University Computer Center - ACOnet - VIX Universitaetsstrasse 7, A-1010 Vienna, Austria, Europe Tel: ++43 1 4277 - 14070 (Fax: - 9140) KB1970-RIPE
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