On 8/2/20 4:11 PM, John Pierce wrote:
isn't it more that they simply won't work with newer boots that were signed
by the new keys? and the updated BIOS's won't boot older OS versions that
weren't signed by the new keys?
I don't know if the Secure Boot PKI has a publicly documented
contingency plan for a compromised CA, but my understanding is that
there are multiple slots for signatures:
http://dreamhack.it/linux/2015/12/03/secure-boot-signed-modules-and-signed-elf-binaries.html
So, I would guess that clients would receive a new trust DB that did not
contain the old root CA, and new bootloaders signed by both the old root
CA and the new CA. The new bootloaders would work on both new and old
systems, having signatures from both. Old bootloaders would not work on
new clients.
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