I want to stress the point made here. Please continue the rather childish accusations *in private*. On 08/07/2015 08:52 AM, Frank Waarsenburg wrote: > Time to unsubscribe from Bugtraq. I follow that list to be informed > of vulnerabilities, not to get spammed by fighting ego's. Get a > life. > > ___________________________________ > > Frank Waarsenburg Chief Information Security Officer > > RAM Infotechnology > > -----Original Message----- From: Steve Friedl > [mailto:steve@xxxxxxxxxxx] Sent: vrijdag 7 augustus 2015 8:17 To: > 'Stefan Kanthak'; 'Mario Vilas' Cc: 'bugtraq'; 'fulldisclosure' > Subject: RE: [FD] Mozilla extensions: a security nightmare > >> Posting on top because that's where the cursor happens to be is >> like > sh*tt*ng in your pants because that's where your *ssh*l* happens to > be! > > Here, let me fix this for you: > >> "I don't expect to be taking seriously by any technical community" > > -----Original Message----- From: Stefan Kanthak > [mailto:stefan.kanthak@xxxxxxxx] Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2015 > 12:33 PM To: Mario Vilas Cc: bugtraq; fulldisclosure Subject: Re: > [FD] Mozilla extensions: a security nightmare > > "Mario Vilas" <mvilas@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> W^X applies to memory protection, completely irrelevant here. > > I recommend to revisit elementary school and start to learn reading! > > http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Aug/8 > > | JFTR: current software separates code from data in virtual memory > and | uses "write xor execute" or "data execution prevention" > to | prevent both tampering of code and execution of data. | > The same separation and protection can and of course needs to be | > applied to code and data stored in the file system too! > >> Plus you're saying in every situation when a user can overwrite its >> own binaries in its own home folder it's a bug > > Again: learn to read! > > <http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Aug/14> > > | No. Writing executable code is NOT the problem here. | The problem > is running this code AFTER it has been tampered. | (Not only) Mozilla > but does NOT detect tampered code. > >> - that would make every single Linux distro vulnerable whenever you >> install some software in your own home directory that only you can >> use. > > # mount /home -onoexec > >> If you're talking about file and directory permissions it makes >> sense to talk about privilege escalation. > > No. > >> But I don't think you really understand those security principles >> you're citing. For example, can you give me an example of an >> attack > scenario? > > The attack vector is OBVIOUS, exploitation is TRIVIAL. > >> Also, take a chill pill. Your aggressive tone isn't really helping >> you at all. > > Posting on top because that's where the cursor happens to be is like > sh*tt*ng in your pants because that's where your *ssh*l* happens to > be! > -- Jakob Holderbaum, M.Sc. Embedded Software & Test Engineer 0176 637 297 71 http://jakob.io/ http://jakob.io/mentoring/ hi@xxxxxxxx @hldrbm
