"Mario Vilas" <mvilas@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > W^X applies to memory protection, completely irrelevant here. I recommend to revisit elementary school and start to learn reading! http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Aug/8 | JFTR: current software separates code from data in virtual memory and | uses "write xor execute" or "data execution prevention" to | prevent both tampering of code and execution of data. | The same separation and protection can and of course needs to be | applied to code and data stored in the file system too! > Plus you're saying in every situation when a user can overwrite its > own binaries in its own home folder it's a bug Again: learn to read! <http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Aug/14> | No. Writing executable code is NOT the problem here. | The problem is running this code AFTER it has been tampered. | (Not only) Mozilla but does NOT detect tampered code. > - that would make every single Linux distro vulnerable whenever you > install some software in your own home directory that only you can use. # mount /home -onoexec > If you're talking about file and directory permissions it makes sense to > talk about privilege escalation. No. > But I don't think you really understand those security principles you're > citing. For example, can you give me an example of an attack scenario? The attack vector is OBVIOUS, exploitation is TRIVIAL. > Also, take a chill pill. Your aggressive tone isn't really helping you at > all. Posting on top because that's where the cursor happens to be is like sh*tt*ng in your pants because that's where your *ssh*l* happens to be!
