"Reindl Harald" <h.reindl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Am 11.08.2013 22:15, schrieb Stefan Kanthak: >> "Reindl Harald" <h.reindl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> Am 10.08.2013 16:52, schrieb Tobias Kreidl: >>>> It is for this specific reason that utilities like suPHP can be used as a powerful tool to at least keep the >>>> account user from shooting anyone but him/herself in the foot because of any configuration or broken security >>>> issues. Allowing suexec to anyone but a seasoned, responsible admin is IMO a recipe for disaster. >>> >>> and what makes you believe that a developer can not be a "seasoned, responsible admin"? >> >> Because developers write functions like "system", "symlink" and "suexec" >> which can create havoc (and are WELL-KNOWN for creating havoc since >> years) and allow everybody to call them in the default configuration of >> their software. > > a so because some stupid developers all are faulty? If you say so: OK. Read again what I wrote, carefully! >>> bullshit, many of the "seasoned, responsible admins" which are only >>> admins are unable to really understand the implications of whatever >>> config they rollout >> >> It was the developer who created and published this vulnerable software >> or the vulnerable default configuration in the first place. > > it was the admin who did not RTFM and rolled out default > settings in environents with untrustable code JFTR: untrustable <> vulnerable! Read again what I wrote, carefully. If you'd have a clue you may have heard of concepts like "fail safe" or "safe default configuration". ANY software with an insecure default configuration is DEFECTIVE! JFTR: why should gazillions of users/administrators fix the fault(s) of a single/few developer(s)? >> If a user/administrator who installs software has to turn insecure >> features OFF its the developer who is to blame, and of course the >> testers, the QA and the management too > > not entirely untrue, but anybody who thinks he can install > whatever server-software with defaults, not RTFM and call > hiself a serious admin is a fool Why not: I expect every developer to exercise all due diligence, test the code, and ship it with a SECURE default configuration. Software with an insecure default configuration is DEFECTIVE! > again: > symlinks are to not poision always and everywhere > they become where untrusted customer code is running > blame the admin which doe snot know his job and not > the language offering a lot of functions where some > can be misused Again: symlinks are well-known as attack vector for years! It's not the user/administrator who develops or ships insecure code! Stefan
