-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Network Building Mediator Document ID: 111014 Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100526-mediator http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100526-mediator.shtml Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2010 May 26 1600 UTC (GMT) - --------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco Network Building Mediator (NBM) products. These vulnerabilities also affect the legacy Richards-Zeta Mediator products. This security advisory outlines details of the following vulnerabilities: * Default credentials * Privilege escalation * Unauthorized information interception * Unauthorized information access Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Workarounds that mitigate some of the listed vulnerabilities are available. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100526-mediator.shtml Affected Products ================= These vulnerabilities affect the legacy Richards-Zeta Mediator 2500 product and Cisco Network Building Mediator NBM-2400 and NBM-4800 models. All Mediator Framework software releases prior to 3.1.1 are affected by all vulnerabilities listed in this security advisory. This table provides information about affected software releases: +---------------------------------------+ | Cisco Bug | Affects Software | | ID | Releases | |-------------+-------------------------| | CSCtb83495 | 1.5.1, 2.2, 3.0.8 | |-------------+-------------------------| | CSCtb83607 | 2.2, 3.0.8 | |-------------+-------------------------| | CSCtb83618 | 1.5.1, 2.2, 3.0.8 | |-------------+-------------------------| | CSCtb83631 | 1.5.1, 2.2, 3.0.8 | |-------------+-------------------------| | CSCtb83505 | 1.5.1, 2.2, 3.0.8 | |-------------+-------------------------| | CSCtb83512 | 1.5.1, 2.2, 3.0.8 | +---------------------------------------+ Vulnerable Products +------------------ Users can determine the version of the Mediator Framework running on a device by logging into the device. After a successful login, the device will display the version of Mediator Framework running on the device. The following example identifies a Cisco Network Building Mediator that is running Mediator Framework version 3.1.1: Mediator Operating Environment 3.0.4 Mediator Framework (tm) 3.1.1 Copyright ) 2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. Serial number 05-xxxxx Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= The Cisco Network Building Mediator is a platform that transforms the way buildings are designed, operated, and experienced. Cisco Network Building Mediator collects data from sources that include the building, IT, energy supply, and energy demand systems, which use different protocols that are otherwise unable to communicate with one another. The Cisco Network Building Mediator normalizes the data into a common data representation. This ability enables the Cisco Network Building Mediator to perform any-to-any protocol translation and to provide information to the end user in a uniform presentation. This security advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities in the legacy Richards-Zeta Mediator and the Cisco Network Building Mediator. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Default credentials +------------------ Default credentials are assigned for several predefined user accounts on the device including the administrative user account. Any user with network access to the device can log in as an administrator and take complete control over the vulnerable device. * CSCtb83495 ( registered customers only) has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2010-0595. Privilege escalation +------------------- Vulnerabilities in this category enable unauthorized users to read and modify device configuration. A malicious user must authenticate as an existing user but does not need to have administrator privileges or know administrator credentials to modify device configuration. Both vulnerabilities can be exploited over either transport protocol (HTTP or HTTPS). Additionally, the vulnerability described by Cisco Bug ID CSCtb83618 ( registered customers only) can be used to reload the vulnerable device. Repeated exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to a prolonged denial of service (DoS) condition. * CSCtb83607 ( registered customers only) (registered customers only) has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2010-0596. This vulnerability could enable any user to read and modify device configuration. * CSCtb83618 ( registered customers only) has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2010-0597. This vulnerability could enable any user to read and modify device configuration using XML RPC protocol. Additionally, this vulnerability can be exploited to reload the affected device. Unauthorized information interception +------------------------------------ The following vulnerabilities reflect the fact that sessions between an operator workstation and the Cisco Network Building Mediator are not protected against unauthorized interception. A malicious user able to intercept the sessions could learn any credentials used during intercepted sessions (for administrators and non-administrators alike) and could subsequently take full control of the device. * CSCtb83631 ( registered customers only) has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2010-0598. This vulnerability could allow a malicious user intercepting an HTTP session to access to Administrator credentials. * CSCtb83505 ( registered customers only) has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2010-0599. This vulnerability could allow a malicious user intercepting an XML RPC session to access to Administrator credentials. Unauthorized information access +------------------------------ A malicious user could read one of the system configuration files. This configuration file contains user accounts details, including passwords. Authentication is not required to read this configuration file and an attacker could perform this attack over either XML RPC or XML RPC over HTTPS protocol. * CSCtb83512 ( registered customers only) has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2010-0600. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this security advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCtb83495 - Default credentials present on the system CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector Network Access Complexity Low Authentication None Confidentiality Impact Complete Integrity Impact Complete Availability Impact Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 Exploitability Functional Remediation Level Official Fix Report Confidence Confirmed CSCtb83607 - Privilege escalation possible over HTTP protocol CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector Network Access Complexity Low Authentication Single Confidentiality Impact Complete Integrity Impact Complete Availability Impact Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability Functional Remediation Level Official Fix Report Confidence Confirmed CSCtb83618 - Privilege escalation possible over XML RPC protocol CVSS Base Score - 9 Access Vector Network Access Complexity Low Authentication Single Confidentiality Impact Complete Integrity Impact Complete Availability Impact Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability Functional Remediation Level Official Fix Report Confidence Confirmed CSCtb83631 - Possible intercept of unencrypted HTTP sessions CVSS Base Score - 9.3 Access Vector Network Access Complexity Medium Authentication None Confidentiality Impact Complete Integrity Impact Complete Availability Impact Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.7 Exploitability Functional Remediation Level Official Fix Report Confidence Confirmed CSCtb83505 - Possible intercept of unencrypted XML RPC sessions CVSS Base Score - 9.3 Access Vector Network Access Complexity Medium Authentication None Confidentiality Impact Complete Integrity Impact Complete Availability Impact Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 7.7 Exploitability Functional Remediation Level Official Fix Report Confidence Confirmed CSCtb83512 - Access to sensitive information over XML RPC CVSS Base Score - 10 Access Vector Network Access Complexity Low Authentication None Confidentiality Impact Complete Integrity Impact Complete Availability Impact Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 Exploitability Functional Remediation Level Official Fix Report Confidence Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of any of these vulnerabilities could result in a malicious user taking complete control over an affected device. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the software table below names a Mediator Framework software release. If a given software release is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. Cisco recommends upgrading to the latest available release where possible. All vulnerabilities are fixed in Mediator Framework release 3.1.1 and above. Mediator Framework release 3.1.1 is the recommended migration path for all Mediator Framework releases. Vulnerabilities do not affect Mediator Operating Environment. +---------------------------------------+ | Affected | First Fixed | | Software | Release | | Releases | | |------------------+--------------------| | 1.5 | 1.5.1.build.14-eng | |------------------+--------------------| | 2.2 | 2.2.1.dev.1 | |------------------+--------------------| | 3.0 | 3.0.9.release.1 | +---------------------------------------+ Fixed 3.1.1 and 3.0.9 Mediator Framework software can be downloaded from the Software Center on http://www.cisco.com by visiting http://www.cisco.com/cisco/psn/web/download/index.html and navigating to Physical Security and Building Systems > Smart Connected Buildings > Cisco Network Building Mediator. To obtain fixed 1.5.1 and 2.2 Mediator Framework software and configTOOL version 3.1.0b1 contact Cisco TAC. Workarounds =========== Default credentials +------------------ Administrator's credentials can be changed using the procedure as described in Cisco Network Building Mediator User Guide at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/physical_security/cnbm/User/guide/CNBM__UG.pdf Details of the procedure are given in the section 2-10 Recovering the Cisco Network Building Mediator Password. Privilege escalation +------------------- There are no workarounds for these vulnerabilities. Unauthorized information interception +------------------------------------ The following workaround is applicable only to the vulnerability related to HTTP protocol. There is no workaround for the vulnerability that affects XML RPC service. The workaround for this vulnerability is to disable HTTP service and use HTTPS instead. The HTTPS service is enabled and running by default and no further actions are needed to enable it. The HTTP service can be disabled with configTOOL. The configTOOL is the software running on the operator workstation and is used to configure the Multi-Protocol Exchange of the Cisco Network Building Mediator. After applying this workaround to software releases 1.5.1 and 2.2, configTOOL version 3.1.0b1 is required to continue configuring Cisco Network Building Mediator via configTOOL. To start configTOOL, double-click the Cisco Network Building Mediator configTOOL shortcut icon on the desktop, or choose Start > All Programs > Network Building Mediator configTOOL. Connect to a Cisco Network Building Mediator using the procedure as described in Cisco Network Building Mediator User Guide at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/physical_security/cnbm/User/guide/CNBM__UG.pdf section 3-2 Connecting to the Cisco Network Building Mediator Using configTOOL. Inside the Node tree pane, expand theservices tab, and then expand tab the network tab. Click the http_server tab, and then click the Enabled to uncheck it. Unauthorized information access +------------------------------ There is no workaround for this vulnerability. Mitigation +--------- The following mitigation can reduce risk from unauthorized access to the Cisco Network Building Mediator and minimize the risks associated with the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. This mitigation is not effective against unauthorized information interception vulnerabilities as exploitation of these vulnerabilities do not depend on accessing the device itself, but on intercepting session between an operator console and the Cisco Network Building Mediator. Administrators are advised to be selective when choosing the devices that are allowed to establish connections to the Cisco Network Building Mediator. The following rules will allow only legitimate operator console(s) to establish sessions to the Cisco Network Building Mediator. To execute following commands you must have Administrator privileges on the Cisco Network Building Mediator. In the following examples it is assumed that the operator console has IP address 192.0.2.1. The 192.0.2.1 address must be changed to match the IP address used by the designated operator console. The following code must be entered on the console. Please refer to section 2.4 in the user guide at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/physical_security/cnbm/User/guide/CNBM__UG.pdf for information on how to connect to the serial port using hyper-terminal. # The following rule establishes a default policy for INPUT rule chain. # The default policy is to drop all packets unless they are explicitly # permitted by a rule in the INPUT chain iptables -P INPUT DROP # This rule will allow all traffic from operator console with # IP address of 192.0.2.1 to the Cisco NBM # # Change 192.0.2.1 to match IP address used by your operators console. iptables -I INPUT 1 --source 192.0.2.1 -j ACCEPT # Repeat the previous command if you have more than one operator console. # Increment the number after the "INPUT" keyword for each console you # are adding. # # This command will allow second operator console with IP address # of 192.0.2.2 to access the Cisco NBM iptables -I INPUT 2 --source 192.0.2.2 -j ACCEPT When applying rules form the above example care must be taken to allow access to ports or protocols that are used by sensors and other devices deployed in the system that are monitored and controlled by the Cisco Network Building Mediator. Failure to do so will break connectivity to these sensors and devices. Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20100526-mediator.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt@xxxxxxxxx or security-alert@xxxxxxxxx for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@xxxxxxxxx Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. These vulnerabilities were discovered during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at : http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100526-mediator.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce@xxxxxxxxx * first-bulletins@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * vulnwatch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx * cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * cisco-nsp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2010-May-26 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkv9S00ACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uDJRQCcCCww9H/6P7BHqAZ9k29Tq4hj EWQAn3eEfS/iAcbfn5ERow7JQO4QmnPg =bCsA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
